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Peace movements can be defined as social movements that aim to protest against the per-
ceived dangers of political decision-making about armaments.1 During the Cold War, the 
foremost aim of peace protests was to ban atomic weapons and to alert the public about 
the dangers of these new powerful means of destruction. These antinuclear protests during 
the Cold War could be seen as the embodiment of a contemporary history of Europe. Who, 
if not the participants in antinuclear protests, rallied for their non-violent marches and 
manifestations against the bomb, could be better representatives for the reinvention of 
Europe as a peaceful and civilised continent after the horror and devastation caused by 
total and genocidal warfare since 1939? There is a tendency among historians of twentieth-
century Europe to contrast the »dark continent« of the period up till 1945 with the peace-
ful and increasingly affluent heaven of the post-war decades.2 The progressive activism 
and civilian moral certitude of the antinuclear protesters could be seen as a potentially 
important part of this historiographical narrative. The civil activism of peace movement 
mobilization could also serve to correct a bias in some of the recent accounts of Euro-
pean integration in the post-war period, as they tend to offer a top-down approach, fo-
cused on the workings of the bureaucratic machinery in Brussels and in the capital cities, 
and tend to downplay the significance of a bottom-up dynamics of interaction across 
Europe and of the popular attitudes towards integration.3 Peace movements during the 
Cold War, with their grassroots activism, their attempts to connect across national bor-
ders and even across the Iron Curtain, seem to encapsulate the notion of a European civil 
society, a notion which has gained currency after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, when 
East Europeans challenged the ossification of a societal system that was characterised by 
a preponderance of organizational structures and organized forms of sociability.4 But 
while it is »not surprising that peace movements have been amongst the most active trans-
—————— 
1 For a conceptual discussion, see Benjamin Ziemann, Situating Peace Movements in the Political 
Culture of the Cold War. Introduction, in: idem (ed.), Peace Movements in Western Europe, Ja-
pan and the USA during the Cold War, Essen 2007, pp. 11–38. – For his helpful feedback on a 
draft version of this piece and many stimulating discussions I would like to thank Holger 
Nehring. For their unwavering support and for helpful discussions, I am also indebted to Øyvind 
Ekelund, Eva Fetscher, Mike Foley, Anne C. Kjelling, Helge Pharo and Conny Schneider. My 
thanks also go to the editors of the Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, for their support and their pa-
tience. An invitation as a Visiting Scholar to the SFB 640 »Repräsentationen sozialer Ordnung 
im Wandel« at the Humboldt-Universität allowed me to finish the article. My thanks go to Jörg 
Baberowski for this invitation. 
2 For this tendency, see Mark Mazower, Dark Continent. Europe’s Twentieth Century, London 
1998; as a critique see Holger Nehring / Helge Pharo, A Peaceful Europe? Negotiating Peace in 
the Twentieth Century, in: Contemporary European History (CEH) 17, 2008, pp. 277–299. 
3 See the survey of recent literature by Jost Dülffer, Europa – aber wo liegt es? Zur Zeitgeschich-
te des Kontinents, in: AfS 44, 2004, pp. 524–564. 
4 See Manfred Hildermeier / Jürgen Kocka / Christoph Conrad (eds.), Europäische Zivilgesellschaft 
in Ost und West. Begriff, Geschichte, Chancen, Frankfurt 2000. 
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national actors«, the transnational and European dimension of their endeavours is »far 
from straightforward«, as historian Holger Nehring has observed.5 
In this article, I will make an attempt to analyse the European dimension of antinuclear 
peace activism during the Cold War. Protests against the Vietnam war provided a crucial 
link between the peace movement mobilization in the early 1960s and in the late 1970s, 
particularly with regard to anti-Americanism as a frame.6 They are, however, not covered 
here, as the focus of this article is on atomic weapons, which were in many respects at the 
heart of the bloc confrontation during the Cold War. I will develop my argument in three 
steps. First, I will scrutinise the transnational encounters and endeavours of peace move-
ments in the different mobilization cycles in the post-war period, focusing on the period 
until 1963 (I.) and then on the campaign against the Euromissiles in the early 1980s (II.). 
While movement activists established contacts across national borders, they also positioned 
their endeavours both in their domestic national context and in the wider international 
arena. In a second step (III.), I will analyse the framing of antinuclear protest movements.7 
As other constructivist approaches to the study of protest movements, the concept of ›framing‹ 
assumes that shared coherent interpretations of the societal and political reality are a cru-
cial prerequisite for the transformation from latent objective structures which could foster 
protests (such as the existence of nuclear weapons in the context of a system of nuclear 
deterrence) to actual manifest protest performances. Every collective protest is the result of 
specific perceptions which are shared and communicated among the protesters, and might 
differ fundamentally from the perceptions of those who are addressed by the protesters.8 
This perspective matters for an assessment of the European dimension of peace movements. 
Even if they engaged in transnational encounters with other movements across Europe, 
their protests might have been framed by collective perceptions of national identity, or by 
negative frames such as anti-Americanism which posited Europe as the other of an aggres-
sive US policy. In the third and final step (IV.), I will consider gender as a factor for the 
mobilization of peace protests during the Cold War. Drawing mainly on British examples 
from the early 1980s, I will try to decipher the logic of women’s campaigning for nuclear 
disarmament and to understand how they fit into the bigger picture of European peace 
mobilization. 
Every effort to write the history of peace protests as a contribution to a contemporary 
history of Europe must be sketchy and incomplete, due to the limits of linguistic exper-
tise, but also due to the uneven advancement of historical research in this field in different 
European countries.9 In the following, I have heavily relied on the magisterial comparative 
—————— 
5 Holger Nehring, Pacifism, in: Akira Iriye / Pierre-Yves Saunier (eds.), Palgrave Dictionary of 
Transnational History, Houndmills 2009, pp. 803–806, here: p. 803. For an excellent discussion 
of transnational history, see Gerd Rainer Horn / Padraic Kenney, Introduction: Approaches to the 
Transnational, in: idem (eds.), Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989, 
Lanham 2004, pp. ix-xix; on transnational protests, see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement. So-
cial Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge 1998, pp. 176–195. 
6 For the best comparative overview see Christopher Goscha / Maurice Vaïsse (eds.), La guerre du 
Vietnam et l'Europe 1963–1973, Brussels / Paris 2003. 
7 On framing, see Jürgen Gerhards / Dieter Rucht, Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in 
Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany, in: American Journal of Sociology 98, 1992, pp. 
555–596; David Snow / Robert D. Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobili-
zation, in: Bert Klandermans / Hanspeter Kriesi / Sidney Tarrow (eds.), International Social Move-
ment Research, vol. 1, Greenwich 1988, pp. 197–218. 
8 Thorsten Bonacker / Lars Schmitt, Politischer Protest zwischen latenten Strukturen und manifes-
ten Konflikten. Perspektiven soziologischer Protestforschung am Beispiel der (neuen) Friedens-
bewegung, in: Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 32, 2004, pp. 193–213. 
9 See the reports on various European countries in Benjamin Ziemann (ed.), Peace Movements in 
Western Europe, Japan and USA since 1945: Historiographical Reviews and Theoretical Per-  
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overview on antinuclear peace movements in Europe, North America and many other re-
gions of the world provided by Lawrence S. Wittner in his trilogy on the struggle against 
the bomb. The breadth of coverage and the wealth of information in these three volumes 
is unsurpassed.10 
While here is not the place for lengthy historiographical reflections, two unconvincing 
ways to write the history of antinuclear protests shall be addressed briefly. The protests 
against the Euromissiles in the late 1970s and 1980s were not, to make that sure, the result 
of a concerted »Soviet offensive« which tried to manipulate public opinion in Western 
European countries and in the Federal Republic in particular. While individual Commu-
nists had a visible presence in the coordination committees of the broad variety of inde-
pendent peace groups and initiatives, they were certainly not able to set the agenda of 
these protests, as per definition no single individual could become »the centre of […] 
peace action« in a campaign that brought hundreds of thousands people to the streets.11 
A more sympathetic account can be found in Hartmut Kaelble’s impressive book about 
European social history in the post-war period. Kaelble characterises the peace move-
ment as a »new social movement« which »emerged in the early 1980s«, building on a 
»long established European tradition«.12 This is a problematic formulation not only as it 
downgrades some of the most impressive and widespread peace protests in European 
history from the 1950s and early 1960s to a mere »shadowy existence«. It also identifies 
»changing values« as a key factor for the emergence of these ›new‹ social movements.13 
This approach is thus based on the notion of a value change from materialist to postma-
terialist values, which has been developed by the political scientist Ronald Inglehart in 
his book on the »silent revolution« in Western Europe.14 Almost immediately upon its 
publication this book has become an important part of the sociological self-description of 
Western societies, and has hence also had a huge impact on the narratives of social his-
tory.15 As an analytical tool to conceptualise the dynamics of collective protest, and 
peace protest in particular, however, this approach is hardly convincing. There is reason 
to believe that the value change-hypothesis is one of the many examples where an unre-
—————— 
 spectives, Essen 2004 (= Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen No. 32), URL: 
<http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/iga/isb/isb-hauptframe/mitteilungsheft/texte/isb32ziemann.pdf> 
[16.7.2009]; Belinda Davis, What’s Left? Popular Political Participation in Postwar Europe, 
in: AHR 113, 2008, pp. 363–390. 
10 Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament 
Movement Through 1953, Stanford 1993; idem, Resisting the Bomb. A History of the World 
Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970, Stanford 1997; idem, Toward Nuclear Aboli-
tion. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement. 1971 to the Present, Stanford 
2003. 
11 See the unconvincing article by Gerhard Wettig, The last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War. 
Emergence and Development of the Campaign against NATO Euromissiles, 1979–1983, in: 
Cold War History 9, 2009, pp. 79–110, quote p. 92. Wettig makes uncritical use of literature 
based on Stasi-files which aims to show that the peace movement was remote controlled by the 
Stasi. He is also citing unspecified and unreferenced information from intelligence services (p. 
107, fn 120), a clear indication that his argument is not historical but a political accusation. 
12 Hartmut Kaelble, Sozialgeschichte Europas. 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, Munich 2007, p. 314. 
For a substantial critique of Kaelble’s approach in this book see the review by Holger Nehring 
in: Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London XXX, 2008, pp. 123–129. 
13 Kaelble, Sozialgeschichte, p. 306. 
14 Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles among Western 
Publics, Princeton 1977. 
15 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel / Lutz Raphael, Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschich-
te seit 1970, Göttingen 2008, pp. 61–66. 
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flected application of survey methods has created artificial social artefacts.16 In his coding 
of the materialist / postmaterialist divide, Inglehart used the formulation »Making sure 
that this country has strong defence forces« as one of the preferential options to model the 
materialist value syndrome.17 Such a formulation, however, presented to peace move-
mentt activists or sympathisers, must inevitably fail to grasp and address their refusal to 
see the military as the sole or preferential guarantor for material safety in the age of mu-
tually assured nuclear destruction. Quite contrary to Inglehart’s assumption, peace move-
ments were driven by a deep concern about the material wellbeing and safety of citizens 
in Western democracies, a concern which cannot simply be subsumed under the notion 
of a post-materialist interest in self-realization.18 
I. TRANSNATIONAL ENDEAVOURS AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES UNTIL 1963 
August 1945, when the atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, came as a shocking surprise to European peace activists. Many of them 
reacted quickly to articulate their fears and concerns, to condemn the use of nuclear 
weapons and to demand their universal abolition. Amidst the emerging bloc confronta-
tion and the concomitant rise of public anxiety about the expansionist politics of the So-
viet Union, nuclear pacifists were swimming against the tide of public opinion in many 
Western European countries, which supported the bombings and the deployment of nu-
clear weapons in order to contain Communist aggression.19 Nonetheless, the established 
umbrella organizations of peace activists were quick to reassert themselves and to re--
establish their network of transnational contacts. The »War Resisters International« 
(WRI), founded in 1921 as an international network of anarchist and socialist pacifists, 
continued to lobby for the legal acknowledgement of the right to conscientious objection 
and for an abolition of compulsory military service. The radicalism of this approach ap-
pealed for instance to a student of philosophy and sociology at the University of Oslo, 
who joined the Norwegian section of the WRI, Folkereisning mot krig. Johan Galtung, 
born in 1930, was even ready to face six months of imprisonment in 1949 for his total 
refusal to serve in the army as a conscript. Captivated and motivated by the power of the 
non-violent principles of Mohandas K. Gandhi, he published in 1955, together with his 
academic teacher, the philosopher Arne Næss, a book about Gandhi’s political ethics, 
alongside his practical commitment to the anti-militarist ideas of the WRI.20 
The agenda of the WRI, however, gradually changed during this period. After the death 
of Herbert Runham Brown (1879–1949), who had served as the secretary for the interna-
tional network of the WRI since 1923, a generational change in the leadership of the as-
sociation also allowed to broaden the scope of its pacifist work. Since its triennial gen-
eral conference in Braunschweig (Federal Republic) in 1951, the fight against nuclear 
—————— 
16 Cf. Thomas Osborne / Nikolas Rose, Do the Social Sciences Create Phenomena? The Example 
of Public Opinion Research, in: British Journal of Sociology 50, 1999, pp. 367–396. 
17 Inglehart, Silent Revolution, p. 399, see also ibid., pp. 24–43; compare Thomas Rochon, Mo-
bilizing for Peace. The Antinuclear Movements in Western Europe, London 1988, pp. 35–37. 
18 For other empirical criticisms of the value change-argument see Helmut Thome, Wandel zu 
postmaterialistischen Werten? Theoretische und empirische Einwände gegen Ingleharts Theorie-
Versuch, in: Soziale Welt 36, 1985, pp. 27–59; Lars Schmitt, Ökologie und gesellschaftskriti-
sches Bewusstsein. Wie ROT ist eigentlich GRÜN?, Marburg 2002. 
19 Wittner, One World, pp. 80–88, 109–121. 
20 Øyvind Ekelund, Ulike veier til fred. Organisert fredsaktivisme i Norge, 1953–1963, Oslo 2008, 
pp. 30–33, 41; Peter Lawler, A Question of Values: Johan Galtung's Peace Research, Boulder, 
CO 1995, pp. 27 f. 
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armaments was added to the traditional agenda of the WRI. Henceforth, the struggle 
against the bomb accompanied the struggle against conscription.21 Other transnational 
pacifist associations which resumed their agitation since 1945 included the »International 
Fellowship of Reconciliation«, founded in 1919, a network of (Protestant) Christians 
who had committed themselves to absolute non-violence and were trying to implement 
Christian principles in society. Equally, the »Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom« held its first major post-war international congress in Copenhagen in 1949.22 
Since the late 1950s, a new form of peace movement activism came to the fore in 
various European countries. Although characterised by a wide variety of possible forms 
of political engagement and of cultural and political backgrounds, many of these new de-
partures were based on a broad coalition of independent socialist groups and individuals, 
Protestant Christians and other non-Communist oppositional groups.23 In one way or an-
other, these groups challenged the post-war political consensus in Western Europe and its 
foundations, a strict control of participatory impulses through a focus on leadership by 
parliamentary elites and a liberal-conservative anti-Communism as the quasi-official state 
ideology.24 These non-aligned antinuclear movements of the late 1950s and early 1960s 
were embedded in a dense network of transnational contacts and exchanges. They also 
shared their most important form of non-violent political action, a protest march that 
would bring together the diverse coalition of supporters of an abolition of nuclear weapons. 
Movements in many Western European countries followed the trailblazing example of 
the British »Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament« (CND). Founded in early 1958, CND 
had organised a protest march from London to the atomic weapons facility in Aldermaston 
(Berkshire) over the Easter Weekend of the same year. Mostly motivated through direct 
encounters with the British example by foreign activists who had participated, the Alder-
maston march (since 1959 leading in the opposite direction, from Aldermaston to Tra-
falgar Square) was copied and emulated by protesters in many other countries, including 
the Federal Republic, Denmark, Norway, France, Italy, Greece and the Netherlands.25 
In their rhetoric, the activists of CND were setting the tone for the internationalist ap-
peal of these non-aligned antinuclear campaigns. They claimed to represent the »Family 
of Man«, as the title of a popular CND-song put it. This global form of kinship, »the 
biggest on earth«, connected »the miner in Rhondda, the collie in Peking, men across the 
World who reap and plough and spin.« People all over the world were united in this fam-
ily, »whatever the creed, or the colour of the skin«, and they would join ranks in their 
anger and moral revulsion against atomic weapons and against »the men of war who want 
to kill«. Written in 1962, the lines of this song encapsulated the vision of a peaceful world 
society that was bound together and united by the elementary solidarity of the labouring 
people, a vision that transcended boundaries of class, race and religious denomination. 
The horizon of a global connectedness, however, was paradoxically expressed with a 
metaphor that invoked notions of intimacy and of face-to-face interaction: »The whole 
wide world is dad and mother to me.«26 But the transnational, global rhetoric of CND 
—————— 
21 Christian Scharnefsky, »Aktiver Pazifismus«, radikale Kriegsdienstverweigerung und Religi-
on. Die Beziehungen zwischen der War Resisters International, den Quäkern und dem Interna-
tional Fellowship of Reconciliation 1920–1950, in: Helke Stadtland (ed.), Friede auf Erden. 
Religiöse Semantiken und Konzepte des Friedens im 20. Jahrhundert, Essen 2009, pp. 171–
191, here: pp. 179 f., 190 f. 
22 Scharnefsky, Aktiver Pazifismus, pp. 177 f.; Wittner, One World, pp. 155–157. 
23 See Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, pp. 210–240. 
24 Cf. Martin Conway, The Rise and Fall of Western Europe’s Democratic Age, 1945–1973, in: 
CEH 13, 2004, pp. 67–88. 
25 See Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, pp. 205–215, 223 ff., 301–305. 
26 Fred Dallas, The Family of Man (n. d., c. 1962), quoted in: Holger Nehring, Gewalt, Frieden 
und soziale Bewegungen nach 1945, Hagen 2004, pp. 34 f.; for a similar rhetoric in the context  
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was only one important element of its public appeal. At the same time, the campaigners 
presented their quest for a unilateral nuclear disarmament as an attempt to restore, after 
the demise of the colonial Empire, the moral authority and political leadership of Britain 
in the world. A renewed »greatness in the moral sense« would be the result of unilateral 
nuclear disarmament, as an Anglican bishop and supporter of CND formulated in 1965.27 
British CND is not the only example for antinuclear campaigns during the late 1950s 
and 1960s where an internationalist rhetoric was inextricably linked with the sense of a 
peculiar historical mission of the respective nation to foster non-violent foreign policies 
in Europe and the world. While all non-aligned antinuclear movements were to some de-
gree embedded in a network of transnational links and contacts, they were also tapping 
into notions of national identity and were reaffirming the nation-state as an »identity 
space«.28 Two examples from countries at the periphery of Western Europe may suffice 
to illustrate this point. In Norway, antinuclear disarmament was during the early 1950s 
mainly promoted by the members of the Fredens forkjempere i Norge, a group which was 
organised by the Norwegian Communist Party and which was never able to mobilize 
public opinion beyond the very small constituency of the party.29 Attempts to broaden the 
appeal of antinuclear campaigning received a boost after Danish activists had launched 
the Kampagnen mod Atomvåben and staged a large rally in Copenhagen in October 1960. 
About one hundred Norwegian peace activists, many of them members of the WRI, had 
joined the march from Holbæk, where Nike-missiles were deployed, to the Danish capital. 
They then used the momentum to develop a similar campaign at home. Former members 
of the Communist Party were able to draw up a list of »the 13«, a group of 13 men and 
women who represented a broad social and political cross-section of Norwegian society 
and could thus lend an air of respectability to the campaign. Thousands of people marched 
on the streets of Oslo and Bergen on 19 March 1961. No less than 223,000 Norwegians, 
out of a population of less than 3.6 million people, signed an appeal against nuclear arms 
and against weapons tests which was presented by the campaign to the parliament Storting 
in June of the same year.30 
Nonetheless, the campaign of »the 13« faltered quickly, and the attempts of various 
peace groups who launched a new campaign Kampagnen mot Atomvåpen in late 1962 
achieved only very limited positive resonance.31 Antinuclear activism in Norway during 
the early years of the Cold War was hampered by a combination of contradictory histori-
cal experiences. The experience of German occupation from 1940 to 1945 had largely 
undermined the credibility of radical pacifist tenets among the Norwegian electorate. It 
was a direct consequence of these experiences that Norway gave up its traditional neu-
trality and joined NATO in 1949. Even at the peak of the first mobilization wave in 
1961 / 62, Norwegian antinuclear activists where hence very careful not to object against 
—————— 
of the »German Peace Society« (DFG) see Andrew Oppenheimer, By Any Means Necessary? 
West German Pacifism and the Politics of Solidarity, 1945–1974, in: Ziemann, Peace Move-
ments during the Cold War, pp. 41–60, here: p. 51. 
27 Holger Nehring, National Internationalists: British and West German Protests against Nuclear 
Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold 
War, 1957–1964, in: CEH 14, 2005, pp. 559–582, here: p. 566. 
28 Cf. Charles S. Maier, Consigning the Twentieth Century to History. Alternative Narratives for 
the Modern Era, in: AHR 105, 2000, pp. 807–831. 
29 Ekelund, Fredsaktivisme, pp. 64–67. 
30 Ekelund, Fredsaktivisme, pp. 97–107; Lars Rowe / Øyvind Ekelund, The Popular Peace Move-
ment in Norway in the Early Phase of the Cold War, in: Helge Pharo / Sunniva Engh (eds.), An 
Internationalist Tradition? Denmark, Norway and the Twentieth Century Search for an Interna-
tional Order, Oslo 2010 (forthcoming). 
31 Ekelund, Fredsaktivisme, pp. 127–131. 
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the national consensus and demand Norway’s exit from NATO.32 But while the scope of 
the antinuclear campaign in Norway was limited by its geo-strategic position as a small 
country at the Northern fringe of Europe, dependent on protection in a larger defence 
framework, this very position also fostered and strengthened the peculiar sense of mis-
sion and of national identity among Norwegian peace activists. Ever since the peaceful 
severing of the union with Sweden in 1905, in fact the only example of non-violent na-
tion-building in Europe from 1830 until 1945, the intellectual and political elites in Nor-
way had stressed the specific ›peaceability‹ of their nation. This construction of a pecu-
liar national identity rested on the perception that Norwegians had amply demonstrated 
their calling for peace-work: through the activities of the Norwegian Nobel Institute in 
Oslo; through the restless internationalist networking of Christian Lange, who had served 
since 1909 as the Secretary-General of the Interparliamentary Union and was thus a cru-
cial organiser and facilitator of transnational contacts, achievements which were recog-
nised when he was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1921; and through the relief work of 
the explorer Fridtjof Nansen for refugees after the First World War.33 
Already in the interwar period, Norwegian peace activists had tapped into this notion 
that their country had a peculiar mission to facilitate and achieve peace in the interna-
tional arena. The painter and radical pacifist Henrik Sørensen had encapsulated this idea 
in a diary entry written in 1938: 
»As Hellas, that little Greece, accomplished Hellenism, for the whole of humanity, as Palestine 
created Christendom, as Italy, in its time, created the Renaissance, and Holland the new art of 
painting, thus shall the North create the positive peace movement, the new world-will, liberated 
from hatred and from greed for profit.«34 
Lyset fra Norden, the »light from the North« was the telling credo of Sørensen’s peace 
work.35 Norwegian antinuclear pacifists during the 1950s and early 1960s continued to 
conceptualise their activism in terms of the nation as a particularly peaceful identity-
space. Their internal correspondence contains numerous references to the idealised image 
of the peculiar Norwegian peace tradition. In 1962, Norwegian activists from the group 
»Women’s International Strike for Peace« (WISP) wrote to Halvard Lange (1902–1970), 
who had served as a Foreign Minister since 1946 and who was, as a prominent member 
of the Labour Party and also as a son of the pacifist Christian Lange, a crucial figure in 
Norwegian post-war politics. In their letter, the peace activists tried to strengthen the le-
gitimacy of the arguments by stating: »We can also point to the inheritance Fridtjof Nansen 
has given to us«, and were thus tapping into the peculiar Norwegian ›calling‹ to facilitate 
peace.36 
Even in the 1970s and 1980s, the transnational contacts of antinuclear activists in Nor-
way did not effortlessly translate into a European political orientation. As an immediate 
response to the NATO dual-track decision in 1979, a variety of non-aligned peace pro-
testers launched Nei til Atomvåpen (No to Nuclear Weapons) in January 1980 and de-
manded a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries.37 Nei til Atomvåpen, however, repre-
—————— 
32 Rowe / Ekelund, Peace Movement. 
33 See Helge Pharo, Den norske fredstradisjonen – et forskningsprosjekt, in: Historisk tidsskrift 
84, 2005, pp. 239–255; on Nansen see Carl Emil Vogt, Fridtjof Nansen og fredstradisjonen, in: 
ibid., pp. 275–288; on Lange see Irwin Abrams, Christian L. Lange, in: Karl Holl / Anne C. 
Kjelling (eds.), The Nobel Peace Prize and the Laureates, Frankfurt 1994, pp. 161–182; on 
Lange’s internationalism see Karen Gram Skjoldager / Øyvind Tønnesson, Unity and Diver-
gence: Scandinavian Internationalism, 1914–1921, in: CEH 17, 2008, pp. 301–324. 
34 Cited in Ekelund, Fredsaktivisme, pp. 20 f. 
35 Cited ibid., p. 6. 
36 Ibid., pp. 138 f. 
37 Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 68. 
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sented to some extent a continuation of the popular grassroots movement against the de-
cision of the Storting to apply for membership in the European Economic Community in 
1969. The »no«-campaign, founded in August 1970, secured a popular vote of 53.5 % 
against a Norwegian EEC membership in the referendum held in September 1972. Both 
in the semantics of putting the »no« centre stage, and in direct personal continuities repre-
sented by some leading activists, Nei til Atomvåpen tapped into the strong anti-European 
sentiments among the Norwegian population in the early 1970s.38 
Greece is another good example for the connectedness of the transnational endeavours 
of antinuclear protesters and their national identities. The Marathon peace marches in 
Greek since 1963 are perfect examples of a transnational entanglement. In 1963, Grigoris 
Lambrakis, a physician and parliamentary deputy, was the only one who could actually 
complete the march due to repressive measures taken by the police, before he was killed 
by members of a right-wing paramilitary group a couple of weeks later. Lambrakis was 
inspired by the example of CND and had participated in the 1963 Aldermaston march. 
He had marched all the way from Aldermaston carrying a banner »Hellas«, and upon ar-
rival in London »he was laying a wreath on the statue of Byron«, as Lord Byron »was 
for him the symbol of British support for Greek independence«.39 This was truly an en-
counter between »national internationalists«.40 Back in Greece, Lambrakis had the sup-
port of the Bertrand Russell Youth Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, a non-aligned 
student peace group which had also taken, as the very name indicates, CND as a role-
model. Half a million people took part in Lambrakis’ funeral procession, and at least 
250,000 turned up for the second, this time legal instalment of the Marathon march in 
1964, making it both in relative and in absolute terms by far the largest peace rally in 
European history before the anti-Euromissile demonstrations in 1982 / 83. And this un-
precedented level of mobilization was achieved in despite of the apparent »weakness of 
the pacifist and non-aligned traditions in Greece«.41 
For a full explanation, we need to take the question of Cyprus into account, one of the 
most complicated political problems of post-war European history. The island had been 
since 1923 under British sovereignty, and both the Greek majority population on the island 
as well the Greeks in mainland had aimed for Enosis, a unification with Greece since 
1950. But the settlement that was found in 1959 / 60, with an independent Cyprus, a con-
stitutional setting that prohibited Enosis and aimed to establish a joint government and 
administration by Greeks and Turks under the presidency of the Archbishop Makarios, 
was not only a reaction to the agitation and armed attacks by the Turkish Cypriots since 
1958. It also bowed to the overriding security interests of NATO and the USA. Both 
Greece and Turkey had joined NATO in 1952, and the creation of an independent Cyp-
riot state did reflect the general interest to pacify the south-eastern flank of the alliance. 
Although the conservative Greek government under Constantine Karamanlis paid lip 
service to the idea of Enosis, it was clear that it had given up the pursuit of unification in 
favour of a settlement that included financial and military support by NATO members.42 
—————— 
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In this situation it was the United Greek Left (EDA), the legal representation of the 
Communists and their allies, and the affiliated peace association Greek Committee for 
International Détente and Peace (EEDYE), who could exploit the popular longing for 
Enosis and could present themselves as the true patriotic alternative. The mass mobiliza-
tion of the Greek peace movement in 1963 / 64 occurred in the context of recurring vio-
lent confrontations between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. And it rested in particular on 
the fact that EEDYE and the organizers of the Marathon march demanded self-determi-
nation for the Cypriot people (which in fact meant Enosis), rejected NATO-intervention 
in the question of Cyprus and agitated against American military bases in Greece, thus 
both channelling and stirring up further the widespread anti-Americanism in the Greek 
population.43 Whereas the Marathon march was on the surface an example for a transna-
tional entanglement, it was in substance a powerful and highly popular claim for and re-
affirmation of Greek national identity vis-à-vis Turkey, the USA and NATO. 
During the first major wave of mobilization against nuclear weapons from the early 
1950s to 1963, many Western European activists were engaged in transnational encoun-
ters with antinuclear movements in other countries. They discussed possible strategies, 
participated in demonstrations, observed the respective symbols and forms of protest and 
thus contributed to a cross-fertilization of performative protest actions.44 These exchanges, 
however, did not add up to a coherent European civil society. Their ability to transform 
short-lived encounters into a more durable network of transnational exchanges was not 
only hampered by the persistence of national identities and orientations among the ac-
tivists. Another limiting factor was the diversity of the social contexts and strata in which 
the movements were situated, and not least also linguistic problems. As a genuinely trans-
national project, »Pax Christi« is a good example to illustrate this point. The movement 
emerged in November 1944 as an initiative for a »prayer crusade for a conversion of Ger-
many« among a group of laypersons in southern France, organised by the schoolteacher 
Marthe-Marie Dortel-Caudot. As an attempt to convert Germany to Roman Catholicism, 
the movement was a manifestation of French Catholic intransigeance, but also an at-
tempt to address and fill the spiritual vacuum which emerged after the collapse of the 
Nazi regime. Pierre Marie Théas, bishop of Montauban and later of Lourdes, supported 
the lay initiative and served as president of Pax Christi until 1950, based on his own in-
terest in a reconciliation between France and Germany.45 Already in March 1945, 40 
French bishops supported an appeal for a »crusade for reconciliation between France and 
Germany«, which was shortly afterwards broadened to a more general »crusade for 
peace«. Quickly, the Catholic peace movement of Pax Christi branched out in other coun-
tries. Already in 1950, eleven fully organised national sections were counted, including 
those in Austria, Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Based on an initiative of lay-
persons from the diocese of Aachen, who had managed to participate in a pilgrimage to 
Lourdes in 1947, a German section was founded at an international congress in Kevelaer 
in April 1948 in the presence of bishop Théas.46 
—————— 
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In line with the principles for Catholic lay associations before the Second Vatican 
Council, Pax Christi was organised under strict hierarchical control by the bishops, and 
largely rested on the activism of a small elite of laypersons. Its initial focus on French-
German reconciliation and a spiritual renewal after the physical and moral devastation 
through the Second World War soon had to give way to more overtly political issues. 
After the Stockholm Peace Appeal of the Communist Partisans of Peace, issued in March 
1950, the anti-communist agenda of Pax Christi came to the fore. The French section in 
particular, confronted with the increasing popularity of the Communist Mouvement de la 
paix (MVP), had to adapt its public rhetoric and its analysis of the dangers emanating 
from the Cold War.47 This was a difficult task, as already the use of the term ›peace‹ and 
the discussion of the dangers of the H-bomb seemed to implicate a leaning towards Com-
munist ideas and was hence observed with strong suspicion by the Holy See, as was the 
internationalist structure of Pax Christi.48 Since 1950, the members of Pax Christi began 
to discuss the significance of nuclear weapons. An article in the journal of the movement, 
published in January 1954, still insisted that an atomic bomb would equal a certain num-
ber of traditional bombs and explosives in its destructive effects. But the article also noted 
that the impact of this new weapon in a period of peace was different, as the nuclear 
bomb, through its sheer presence, would foster »la peur dans l’esprit des hommes, et la 
méfiance entre les Etats.« In December 1954, the national council of Pax Christi in France 
issued its first official statement on the production of French atomic weapons. Based on 
the Christian principles of Pax Christi, and on the insights of French atomic scientists, it 
stated that a turn from the civilian to the military use of atomic energy by France would 
be »une douloureuse méconnaissance de sa mission dans le monde«.49 
Thus, like Catholic peace initiatives in other countries, notably in Italy50, the French 
section of Pax Christi was increasingly able to address political topics and to overcome 
the perception that ›peace‹ as an issue was only the result of Communist propaganda. 
But this incremental politicisation did not directly translate into a different quality of the 
transnational encounters which were organised by the movement. In late July 1951, Pax 
Christi had already organised the fourth international pilgrimage to Lourdes. Over a pe-
riod of four days, 25,000 pilgrims from no less than 20 countries attended a series of talks, 
masses and public exchanges under the heading of the creation of an »international con-
science«.51 But for Robert Bosc, one of the organisers of the various rallies, the quality 
of these personal contacts remained insufficient and did not properly reflect the transna-
tional aspirations of the movement: 
»La cause en est évidemment que Pax Christi étant un mouvement de masse, les pèlerins de Lour-
des pour la plupart gens très simples, paysans bavarois et hollandais, employés de Liverpool et de 
Rotterdam, métallos de Milan et de Lille, ne peuvent en trois jours vaincre leur timidité naturelle 
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face à l’étranger et, le voudraient-ils, ils seraient freinés dans leur élan par la diversité des langues. 
Le seul moyen qui leur est donné de communier aux mêmes sentiments et d’emporter de Lourdes 
une impression inoubliable de catholicité, c’est la participation aux mêmes prières, aux mêmes 
chants, aux mêmes cérémonies.«52 
The highly formalised Catholic ritualism of prayers, chants and ceremonies was, accord-
ing to this observer, the major unifying bond which helped to enact the Europeanism of 
Pax Christi in the early 1950s. When Europeans from very diverse social and national 
backgrounds met at Lourdes, they did not share a joint understanding of security policies 
or of the inherent dangers of the Cold War system of deterrence, but their catholicity. 
The Catholic pacifism of Pax Christi had ambivalent results, though. On the one hand, 
the Catholic faith integrated activists across Europe. On the other hand, it fragmented the 
antinuclear campaign along denominational lines, as only very few Catholics, usually 
coming from the left and anti-hierarchical fringe of the Church, would join campaigns 
such as CND or the Easter March movement.53 This did only change during the 1980s, 
when Catholic activists were an integral part of the antinuclear campaigns in the Nether-
lands, Germany, Italy, Belgium and other countries.54 
II. THE EUROPEANISM OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST CRUISE MISSILES AND 
ITS LIMITS 
On 12 December 1979, the NATO council decided to modernize the Intermediate Nu-
clear Forces of the Atlantic Alliance. Provided that negotiations with the Soviet Union 
about an abolition or reduction of their SS–20 missiles failed, the alliance would deploy 
464 Cruise Missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles in five Western European countries. 
This was a momentous decision not only as it highlighted the crisis of détente and ushered 
into a new hardening of the bloc confrontation in what was to become the final decade of 
the Cold War.55 Inadvertently, the NATO dual track decision also created new opportu-
nities for peace protests and unleashed a wave of citizen’s activism across Europe. 
Measured both in terms of movement activists, in the number of protest events and in the 
number of people participating in demonstrations and other protest events, the campaign 
against the Euromissiles by far dwarfed the first cycle of antinuclear protests until 1963. 
From all Western European countries during the 1980s, France was the only country with 
a very low level of activism. According to opinion polls conducted in 1986, only 0.1 % 
of all French described themselves as peace movements activists, compared with 2.7 % in 
the Federal Republic, the highest percentage in five Western European countries.56 Public 
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concern and unrest about nuclear armaments grew also in those countries which were not 
directly affected by the deployment of the missiles. While it is correct that the new peace 
movement mobilization of the 1980s »was […] a more self-consciously transnational 
movement that its predecessor« in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the extent to which the 
movement was able »to formulate all-European policies« must be questioned.57 As I will 
argue in this section and in the following, some strands of the 1980s campaign were in-
extricably linked to specific national experiences and expectations rather than to a widely 
shared set of active and positive European policies with regard to fostering peace in a nu-
clear age. 
The first example for this trend is drawn from the antinuclear mobilization in the Federal 
Republic. As in other Western European countries, notably the Netherlands, Great Britain 
and the Scandinavian countries, initiatives by both Protestant ministers and the laity played 
a crucial role for the organizational and conceptual shape of the West German peace 
movement. While many grassroots-activists worked in the context of local parish initia-
tives and structures, prominent theologians gave a public face and voice to the move-
ment and created the image of the Protestant churches of the EKD (Evangelische Kirche 
Deutschlands, which comprised Lutheran and Reformed Churches and a ›Union‹ of both 
on the former Prussian territories) as a »peace church«, which was devoted to disarma-
ment and reconciliation.58 One of the many regional initiatives was a group working in 
Swabia in the south-west of Germany, called »Living without Armament« (Ohne Rüstung 
Leben). It has been called one of the »pioneers« for the new peace movement in Ger-
many during the 1980s.59 This assertion seems not only fully justified as the group had 
commenced its work already in 1976 and thus before the dual-track decision. The initia-
tive taken by this group originated from the 1975 Nairobi congress of the World Ecu-
menical Movement, which had made a commitment to work for a world without arms. 
This had prompted a group Pro Ökumene, which worked in Württemberg to explore ecu-
menical contacts across borders, to put disarmament on its agenda.60 Another defining 
and trailblazing feature of »Living without Armament« was the rather unusual approach 
to mobilization. Whereas peace movements usually mobilize by protesting against the 
decisions taken by politicians, the accent was here on the readiness of individuals to live 
without the »protection« of arms. This objective was based on the Protestant notion that 
»the obstacle on the way to peace are we ourselves«, as human beings who need to be 
self-conscious about their »aggressions and prejudices« and their »mistrustfulness«.61 
The movement did not stage mass rallies or lobbied parliamentarians, but rather asked 
citizens, going public in April 1978, to sign a pledge that they were ready to live without 
arms. This approach had a strong element of individual conversion, which suited the con-
text of the movement, the Protestant church in Württemberg with its strong pietist un-
derpinnings. Conversion was not, as the organizers of the movement were at pains to 
clarify, meant in the sense of conservative Evangelicals who were keen to denounce the 
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sinful nature of human beings. It rather implied a radical break with the rationale for »Real-
politik« in defence policies and its reliance on nuclear deterrence.62 Ohne Rüstung Leben 
collected about 25,000 of these pledges until the autumn of 1983. As a group of activists, 
it was well connected and made its voice heard in the consultation circles of the peace 
movement during the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s.63 
Ohne Rüstung Leben saw some degree of professionalisation when it hired full-time staff 
to run an office in 1980.64 But its core consisted of a circle of friends and acquaintances 
from the Württemberg church. The founding figure and driving force of the group was 
Werner Dierlamm, born in 1927, who had worked as a parish pastor since 1954, serving 
from 1975 until his retirement in 1990 in Fellbach, a small town close to Stuttgart.65 In a 
typewritten text from 1987, entitled »Biographical information on our action Ohne Rüs-
tung Leben«, Dierlamm related his activism in the peace movement to recollections of 
the Second World War. He relays how initially he had to fight against his enthusiasm for 
war, which changed when his oldest brother had to serve at the Eastern front in 1942 and 
died within weeks, leaving his mother breaking into tears. He goes on to write about his 
stint as an air force-auxiliary since late 1944, when he had to service a Flak-cannon and 
to watch how »enemy bomb squadrons« bombed the town of Heilbronn, where his parents 
and siblings lived. Back in Heilbronn on 7 December 1944 while on leave, he watched 
the corpses lined up for collection on the pavements. »When I read passages in the bible 
such as Amos 8,3 (›There will be dead bodies everywhere …‹), I always have this image 
in my mind’s eye«. At the end of the war, he was the only surviving member of his stem 
family, and from this statement the text moves on to mention the campaign against a re-
militarisation of the Federal Republic in the 1950s, in which he participated as a young 
vicar, »but we could not achieve anything against this«.66 
This text does not only shed light on the underlying biographical continuity in the West 
German peace movement from the early 1950s to the 1980s, which is often overlooked 
as the focus for the 1980s campaign is on the thousands of rank-and-file activists from a 
younger generation, born in the 1950s and early 1960s. It is also revealing in its sense of 
prolonged victimisation and powerlessness which bridged and levelled the caesura of 
1945. While Dierlamm could only watch the devastation caused by Allied bombing air-
craft, also his later attempts to prevent remilitarisation from happening were in vain, and 
the subsequent campaign »Fight against Atomic Death«, in which he took part in 1957 / 58, 
again »fell apart« after a short time.67 It was only with »Living without Armament« that 
Dierlamm finally regained a sense of agency, and for Dierlamm one crucial point of the 
campaign was to inject as many other people as possible with this awareness of both the 
need and possibility for immediate action for the right cause. Dierlamm summed up this 
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idea at the end of his autobiographical sketch with a reference to the prophet Jeremiah, in a 
passage where the LORD said to the people of Judah (Jer. 21, 8): »Listen! I, the LORD, am 
giving you a choice between the way that leads to life and the way that leads to death«.68 
The personal recollections of the founding figure of Ohne Rüstung Leben are only one 
of many examples for the ways in which the protests against the dual-track solution in 
the Federal Republic were bound up with symbols of the Allied bombing campaign and 
thus with reminiscences to the victimisation of Germans towards the end of the Second 
World War. Posters issued by the peace movement provide other examples for the sym-
bolism of the bombing war.69 This focus on the specific trajectory of German experiences 
of victimisation coincided with a certain perplexity with regard to the conceptual under-
pinnings for a specific European approach to the politics of peaceful conflict resolution 
among key actors in the Protestant churches. Even amidst an ecumenical initiative to for-
mulate substantial ideas on world peace and to flag the significance of non-violence – 
which also formed the backdrop for Ohne Rüstung Leben -, Protestant debates on the 
theological connotations of peace in West Germany since the mid-1970s »kept their un-
mistakable national signature«.70 While Protestants held many debates on the need for a 
European perspective on security and foreign policies, and had the best intentions to euro-
peanize their approach, the results were meagre. Erwin Wilkens, a high-ranking official 
in the EKD, noted with some exasperation in a letter in 1977: »In ecclesiastical and theo-
logical terms, nothing with regard to Europe comes to my mind.«71 
While Protestant peace activists in the Federal Republic during 1970s and 1980s were 
preoccupied with the specific trajectory of German history in the twentieth century, 
Christians in the Netherlands were trailblazers in their attempts to formulate a coherent 
European approach to the politics of peace and disarmament. Many of these ideas and 
initiatives were formulated by the Interchurch Peace Council (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, 
IKV), which emerged as a key player and »leading force« in attempts to overcome the 
bloc confrontation through »détente from below«.72 Based on an initiative by the Dutch 
section of Pax Christi, the IKV had been founded in 1966 as a steering committee and 
think-tank that should advise the churches on issues of peace and war. While initially 
supported by the Catholic church and the two major reformed, Calvinist churches, the 
Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk and the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland, six smaller 
Protestant denominations quickly joined the IKV. While the council was the decision-
making body of the IKV and could alone represent it authoritatively in public, many local 
and parish level groups supported the work with discussions and initiatives. Shortly after 
the campaign against the neutron bomb had started in 1977, about 300 local groups 
worked in the framework of the IKV.73 
—————— 
68 Werner Dierlamm, Biographisches zu unserer Aktion Ohne Rüstung Leben, 15.9.1987, BfZ, 
Ohne Rüstung Leben, file 42. 
69 Benjamin Ziemann, The Code of Protest. Images of Peace in the West German Peace Move-
ments, 1945–1990, in: CEH 17, 2008, pp. 237–261, here: p. 250–252; see Jörg Arnold, »Krieg 
kann nur der Wahnsinn der Menschheit sein!« Zur Deutungsgeschichte des Luftangriffs vom 
22. Oktober 1943 in Kassel, in: Dietmar Süß (ed.) Deutschland im Luftkrieg. Geschichte und 
Erinnerung, Munich 2007, pp. 135–149, here: pp. 147 f.; on the context, see Mary Nolan, Ger-
mans as Victims during the Second World War. Air Wars, Memory Wars, in: Central Euro-
pean History 38, 2005, pp. 7–40. 
70 Katharina Kunter, »… daß die Welt zähneknirschend das Wort vom Frieden vernehmen muß«. 
Protestantische Kontroversen zur europäischen Entspannungspolitik in den beiden deutschen 
Staaten, in den Niederlanden und im Ökumenischen Rat der Kirchen in den achtziger Jahren, 
in: Stadtland, Friede auf Erden, pp. 275–289, here: p. 279. 
71 Cited ibid., p. 279. 
72 Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 140. 
73 Leon Wecke / Ben Schennink, Die »neue« Friedensbewegung in den Niederlanden, in: Steinweg, 
Die neue Friedensbewegung, pp. 284–309, here: pp. 286–289. 
European Peace Movements during the Cold War and their Elective Affinities 365 
From the beginning, the ecumenical work of the IKV began to reflect on the European 
dimension of reconciliation and security and envisaged a form of peace work that should 
transcend the Iron Curtain. Consequently, the IKV had welcomed the Ostpolitik announced 
by the incoming government of Willy Brandt in 1969, and had condemned the suppres-
sion of the Prague Spring in 1968. Already in 1972, the IKV had published a report on 
»The Future of Europe«, which criticised the bipolar system of nuclear deterrence and 
called upon governments in East and West to respect human rights and to overcome the 
division of Europe. In its campaign against the Euromissiles from 1979 onward, the IKV 
continued to insist on the inextricable link between disarmament and human rights and 
to speak out on behalf of dissidents in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR. During the 
rally in Amsterdam on 21 November 1981, for instance, which brought together 400,000 
people in protest against the dual-track solution, Mient Jan Faber, one of the key strate-
gists of the IKV, read out and supported a declaration by the Czechoslovakian dissidents 
of Charter 77. A couple of weeks later, after the declaration of martial law in Poland and 
the suppression of the Solidarność movement, Faber drew a parallel between the devel-
opment of the peace movement in Western Europe and the struggle for democracy in the 
East. Under the heading »Europe for Europeans«, IKV-activists continued to connect with 
independent peace movements in Eastern Europe.74 
When the dual-track decision triggered a new wave of peace mobilization in Western 
Europe, the Dutch activists had already had a considerable advantage in the organization 
of protest events and the formulation of statements. Since 1967, for instance, the IKV had 
organised an annual »peace week« in the third week of September, which served as a 
platform for different opinions and initiatives.75 In the aftermath of the NATO-decision, 
the IKV head office was flooded with queries and invitations from West German activists 
to give papers and visit local groups in the Federal Republic. Since January 1980, the IKV 
employed a German secretary to coordinate these contacts. Volkmar Deile, the Protestant 
minister in charge of the West German group »Action Symbol for Atonement / Peace Ser-
vices« (Aktion Sühnezeichen / Friedensdienste, ASF), described the infrastructure and in-
fluence of the IKV as a »dreamlike idea«. Following a visit in spring 1980, ASF began 
to emulate both the example of the »peace week« and the peace newspaper issued by the 
IKV.76 
Not only the top-level IKV strategists were attempting to establish a network of cross-
European contacts. Also the local IKV-branches and initiatives, many of which were 
based at the parish level, were since 1978 involved in a growing network of contacts with 
Protestant Christians in the GDR. In 1977, the Dutch protests against the Neutron Bomb, 
which had included a group close to the Dutch Communist Party, »Christians against the 
—————— 
74 Beatrice de Graaf, Über die Mauer. Die DDR, die niederländischen Kirchen und die Friedens-
bewegung, Münster 2007, pp. 63–65, 116–118, 170–173. Contrary to the contemporary cri-
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Dutch neutrality. See Remco van Diepen, Hollanditis. Nederland en het kernwapendebat, 1977–
1987, Amsterdam 2004, pp. 235–243. 
75 Wecke / Schennink, Friedensbewegung, p. 288. 
76 Cf. de Graaf, Über die Mauer, p. 120; »Action Reconciliation« is partly incorrect and too weak 
as a translation for the name of ASF, as used by Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 23. 
ASF meant to give a »symbol« (Zeichen) for reconciliation, but it was based on the fundamen-
tal need for an »atonement« (Sühne) of the special German guilt with regard to the Holocaust. 
For this reason, ASF was during the 1980s not only involved in antinuclear campaigning, but 
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concentration camps in Poland and the Soviet Union and to Israel. See Jonathan Huener, Anti-
fascist Pilgrimage and Rehabilitation at Auschwitz: The Political Tourism of Aktion Sühnezei-
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521. 
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Bomb«, had led to contacts with officials from the »League of Protestant Churches« in 
the GDR (Bund Evangelischer Kirchen, BEK). In the following years, the two reformed 
churches in the Netherlands intensified these contacts with the GDR. Facilitated by talks 
with church officials, the number of direct contacts between parish communities in the 
two countries grew from 20 in 1978 to 140 in 1984. While only very few representatives 
of the BEK could travel to the Netherlands, Dutch Protestants repeatedly visited their 
counterparts at the local level. During these contacts, members of local IKV-groups did 
not mince words about the shared responsibility of both superpowers for the nuclear arms 
race. They also promoted their proposals for unilateral disarmament and thus worked like 
a Trojan horse in the GDR. In theological terms, these contacts were based on a shared 
feeling of guilt for the reliance on nuclear weapons for international security. But also 
the German guilt due to complicity with the Nazi-regime played a crucial role for both 
sides. While East German church members referred positively to the Darmstädter Wort 
from 1947, which had acknowledged the guilt of Protestants vis-à-vis the Nazi regime, 
and in particular their mistake to see socialism as a key enemy, the Dutch Protestants 
compared the dangers emanating from nuclear armaments with those posed by the Nazi-
regime.77 These contacts across the Iron Curtain were not only facilitated by a shared re-
jection of the lunacy of the nuclear arms race and a Protestant guilt consciousness. Protes-
tants from the Netherlands and the GDR were also driven to develop a détente from be-
low as they lived in the two most secularised societies in Europe. Their shared interest in 
peace work was also a search for encouragement and new orientation for Christians in a 
secular society.78 
The contacts between the Dutch activists of the IKV and East German Protestants are 
a substantial example for bi-lateral transnational peace movement connections during the 
campaign against the Euromissiles. There were, however, also coordinated attempts to 
connect activists across the continent in order to canvass support for nuclear disarmament. 
»European Nuclear Disarmament« (END), the key platform for these attempts, emerged 
out of debates in the British New Left and the left wing of the Labour Party. Dorothy and 
E. P. Thompson, two of the founding members, had been key figures of the New Left 
since their split with the Communist Party after the crushing of the Hungarian Uprising in 
1956. Ken Coates, who developed the idea for END in conversations with E. P. Thomp-
son, was a miner who had turned himself into a sociology lecturer. He had run defence 
campaigns for East European dissidents and was a leading figure in the Bertrand Russell 
Peace Foundation. Drawing in a number of mainly British veteran activists such as Bruce 
Kent, since 1979 general secretary of CND, and long-time campaigner Peggy Duff, the 
group discussed Thompson’s draft of the END-appeal. The final appeal was launched 
simultaneously in London, Berlin, Oslo, Paris and Lisbon on 28 April 1980.79 
—————— 
77 See de Graaf, Über die Mauer, pp. 140–162, figure p. 149; compare Martin Greschat, The Po-
tency of ›Christendom‹. The example of the Darmstädter Wort 1947, in: Hugh McLeod / Werner 
Ustorf (eds.), The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750–2000, Cambridge 2003, 
pp. 130–142. 
78 Cf. de Graaf, Über die Mauer, p. 150; on secularization in the GDR, see Benjamin Ziemann, 
Religion and the Search for Meaning in a Secular Society, 1945–1990, in: Helmut Walser 
Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History, Oxford 2010 (forthcoming); 
for the Netherlands, see James C. Kennedy, Recent Dutch Religious History and the Limits of 
Secularization, in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kirchengeschichte 99, 2005, 
pp. 79–92. 
79 Patrick M. Burke, European Nuclear Disarmament. A Study of Transnational Social Movement 
Strategy, PhD-Thesis University of Westminster 2004, pp. 39–48; see also idem, A Transcon-
tinental Movement of Citizens? Strategic Debates in the 1980s Western Peace Movement, in: 
Horn / Kenney, Transnational Moments, pp. 189–206; on Coates, see Martin Ceadel, Britain’s 
Nuclear Disarmers, in: Walter Laqueur / Robert Hunter (eds.), European Peace Movements and 
the Future of the Western Alliance, New Brunswick, NJ 1985, pp. 218–244, here: p. 228. 
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Although substantially changed and altered by many hands during the draft process, 
the END-appeal breathed the highflying political idealism and the unrepentant belief in 
the collective agency of the ordinary people which its main ›author‹, the historian E. P. 
Thompson, had displayed at the core of both his political and his scholarly work for 
decades.80 The END-appeal offered a fundamental critique of the Cold War, which had 
led to the division of Europe and had curtailed civil liberties on both sides. Adopting 
non-alignment as its principal attitude, the appeal laid the blame for the nuclear arms race 
on the shoulders of political and military elites in both East and West. Analyzing the in-
creased likelihood and imminence of a nuclear war as a consequence of the arms race 
and the development of tailor-made weapons for a European theatre of war, the appeal 
followed Thompson’s reflections on the economic and military logic of »exterminism«.81 
As a solution, the appeal envisaged to turn Europe from Poland to Portugal in a nuclear-
weapons free zone. As a first step, it demanded to halt the production of SS-20 missiles 
and the deployment of Cruise Missiles. It called upon the citizens in East and West to 
»engage in every kind of exchange« in the pursuit of these aims, and urged them to an-
ticipate the shared citizenship and the unified polity this endeavour could entail: 
»We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn 
to be loyal, not to ›East‹ or ›West‹, but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and 
limitations imposed by any national state.«82 
In the pursuit of these aims, the British END-activists who formed the core of the move-
ment followed a three-pronged strategy.83 Firstly, they tried to influence their core con-
stituency, the British CND, and hoped it would incorporate key ideas of the END-appeal 
into its campaigning against nuclear arms. Secondly, they tried to establish closer links 
with non-aligned peace groups in Western Europe. Thirdly, they were hoping to built a 
cross-continental ›détente from below‹ through contacts with independent peace groups 
and dissidents in Eastern Europe, or, in other words, to foster a pan-European civil soci-
ety.84 Ambitious and truly European as these aims were, they were neither uncontested 
within END nor could they, measured against the own aspirations of the activists, im-
plemented with even only basic success. On the first count, British END and CND were 
»intertwined« particularly in the years from 1981 to 1983, when many local CND-groups 
merged with END groups. But the commitment to the aims of END was largely a sym-
bolic one, mainly represented through E. P. Thompson himself, who was one of the most 
popular speakers on CND-meetings and rallies in the early 1980s. In political terms, how-
ever, campaigning against Soviet nuclear weapons, which was a crucial implication of 
the approach taken by END, proved to be utterly divisive within CND and was never 
—————— 
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adopted by it. This was a clear »victory« for the »pro-Soviet lobby« in CND, which con-
tinued to insist on unilateral British disarmament, and a sign for the substantial »lack of 
influence« any internationalist and Europeanist ideas had in CND.85 When END-activists, 
frustrated by these setbacks and desperate to disentangle themselves from CND, decided 
in 1985 to turn END into a membership organization, no more than 600 people signed 
up.86 
The main vehicle for the second strand of activities, a network of non-aligned groups, 
was the series of annual conventions organised by END, starting in Brussels in 1982, fol-
lowed by meetings in Berlin in 1983, Perugia in 1984 and Amsterdam in 1985. The largest 
of these »bazaars« for the representation of initiatives in many different West European 
countries, the convention in Berlin, attracted 2,500 participants, while the others com-
prised between 700 and 1,000 people. Thematic workshops and discussions in »affinity« 
groups, i.e. among scientists, physicians and women for peace, allowed activists for the 
first time to have a broad-ranging exchange of ideas and steps toward co-operation across 
Europe, and were hence deemed to be a success. Ambivalences and practical problems, 
however, persisted. One problem was to strike a balance between the need to have easily 
recognised »big names« and experts on nuclear armaments as speakers, and the danger 
»to induce passivity« among the grassroots activists who had to listen to their statements.87 
Like every form of face-to-face encounters, these meetings were also prone to be irritated 
by distractions. During the convention in Brussels in 1982, many activists were more in-
terested in the games of the Football World Championship in Spain, which were shown 
on a number of television sets across the conference rooms, than in the complex issues of 
nuclear missiles.88 
As for the third strand of END, a ›détente from below‹ with independent activists across 
the Iron Curtain, it faced principled objections and caused controversies when it came to 
putting these ideas into practice. CND, for instance, met up with and supported groups 
such as Charter 77 and »Freedom and Peace« in Poland on several occasions during the 
early 1980s. Nonetheless, a preference for meetings with official representatives from 
organizations affiliated with the World Peace Council persisted.89 In the END-convention 
process, activists at Perugia in 1984 inaugurated a European Network for East-West Dia-
logue, which prioritised contacts with unofficial groups in Eastern Europe. This initia-
tive, however, was opposed by E. P. Thompson, who perceived it to be focused on a 
rather limited number of contact groups. He preferred a wider dialogue with new groups 
such as »Swords into Ploughshares« in the GDR or the »Moscow Trust Group«, which 
were less focused on attention in the Western media than other dissidents. As a conse-
quence, the British END-group never joined the network. These conflicts also laid bare 
tensions within the END convention process, where some activists felt that contacts with 
independent groups in Eastern Europe would challenge the legitimacy of the Warsaw 
Pact regimes and »were thus potentially destabilizing.«90 
—————— 
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It should also be noted that the advances made by Western European peace activists 
were met with anything but unanimous approval by their counterparts behind the Iron 
Curtain. Not all reactions were as hostile as the open letter by the Czech dissident ›Václav 
Racek‹ – his real name was Miroslav Bednář – to E. P. Thompson, published in 1981. 
Racek, who was not a signatory of Charter 77, accused Thompson of naïveté in his pur-
suit of a nuclear-weapons free zone, and compared END with those who had – without 
success, in this reading of the events – tried to appease National Socialism in the 1930s.91 
Other Czechoslovakian dissidents rejected Racek’s direct support of NATO-armaments 
as a guarantee for Western liberties, and developed a wide array of diverse ideas about a 
›third way‹ and about possibilities for cooperation with Western peace activists during 
the early 1980s.92 The prevalent tone, however, remained one of benevolent scepticism. 
It was, as far as the Czechoslovakian dissidents are concerned, comprehensively sum-
med up in the »Anatomy of Reticence«, a text Václav Havel, himself one of the signato-
ries of the 1980 END-appeal, had produced for the END-convention in Amsterdam in 
1985 which he could not attend due to visa restrictions.93 In his analysis of the »mutual« 
reticence between non-aligned peace activists in East and West, Havel pointed to some 
of the more obvious reasons for the lack of trust in and commitment to European peace 
activism among the small number of dissidents in his country. While the activists in the 
West could flag up ›peace‹ in order to unmask the hypocrisy of the arms race, the term 
had »been drained of all content« after decades of official Communist peace rhetoric in 
the East.94 In a stark contrast to subsequent, post-1990 Western appraisals of the ›agency‹ 
of civil society, Havel stressed that the citizens in totalitarian regimes »can do nothing« 
and could hence not share the activism of the »peace fighters in the West«. He also re-
peated the specific problems Czechs would have with »a policy of appeasement«.95 In 
the end, Havel did not fail to identify a possible »common denominator« of peace move-
ments in the East and West, based on a radically altered defence policy on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain and a respect for human rights in »free and independent nations«.96 But 
his overall stance was highly critical. Not only did Havel stress the »Central European 
scepticism about utopianism of all colors«, he also criticised the »enthusiastic« and »his-
trionic«, theatrical posturing of Western peace activists, which was simply too much de-
tached from the more down-to-earth problems people in Eastern Europe faced.97 To sum 
up: many Eastern European oppositionists before 1989 »kept Europe at arm’s length«. 
Also, the encounters between peace activists from East and West did not take place in 
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the idealised sphere of a civil society, but rather through the most basic form of sociability, 
personal encounters across »kitchen tables in Eastern Europe«.98 
As a whole, thus, the END-process indicated a remarkable and fresh departure, a de-
liberate attempt to conceptualise pan-European approaches to nuclear peace activism and 
to translate these into a network of contacts across the Iron Curtain. The conceptual in-
novation represented by END should not, however, lead to exaggerated claims with re-
gard to the resonance of this approach in both Eastern and Western Europe. END was 
certainly not »the mass base and the central rallying point« of the protests against the 
Euromissiles, nor was it, for »the millions of West Europeans who participated in the 
demonstrations and other activities of its constituent groups, […] the very heart and soul 
of the massive European antinuclear campaign« in the 1980s.99 The various national 
campaigns were, as even the example of CND with its high degree of interaction with 
END makes very clear, not simply ›constituent groups‹ of END. And there is no reliable 
evidence to suggest that more than a tiny fraction of the participants in demonstrations in 
the Federal Republic, Italy, the Netherlands or Belgium, to name only the other four 
countries which were directly affected by the dual-track decision, had ever heard of END 
at all.100 With regard to the public resonance of END in Great Britain it seems justified to 
follow the historian Martin Ceadel, who stated in 1985 that, despite the »often high quality 
of its literature«, END »lacks the broad appeal of CND.«101 
In many ways the protest campaign against the Euromissiles was one of the biggest 
popular mass movements in modern European history. In terms of the number of people 
it brought to the streets and the degree of unrest it expressed and channelled it is perhaps 
only comparable with the revolutionary movements in 1848 / 49. And as during the ›spring 
of peoples‹ in 1848, activists from many European countries were able to connect across 
national boundaries, and even across the Iron Curtain, the most heavily secured border in 
history. But while it is hard to overestimate the transnational dimension of these antinu-
clear protests, the European dimension is less clearly defined. Many activists from dif-
ferent countries came together as a result of ›elective affinities‹ (J. W. Goethe), for in-
stance Dutch and German Protestants, Catholics under the banner of Pax Christi102, or 
physicians, scientists and other professionals from various countries in the »affinity 
groups« during the END-conventions. Attempts »to formulate all European-policies«, 
—————— 
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however, were confined to a small minority of intellectuals and peace researchers, and 
their ideas found only very limited resonance among the rank-and-file of the vast grass-
roots movements.103 It would, however, show a grave lack of perspective and proper his-
torical judgement if this limited resonance of blueprints for a non-nuclear, peaceful Europe 
would considered to be a failure of the movement. Such an assessment would overlook 
the unintended side-effects with regard to an Europeanization of protest movements, which 
were partly a consequence of the sheer scale and scope of mobilization across Europe. 
The anti-Euromissiles campaign led to a political realignment, opened up a new political 
space in many European polities and thus also reoriented protest movement actors to is-
sues which were beyond the traditional remit of their activities, both in spatial terms and 
with regard to the issues they addressed. 
Excellent examples for this realignment are Switzerland and Austria. As neutral coun-
tries they were not directly involved in or affected by the decision to deploy Cruise Mis-
siles in neighbouring countries. Nonetheless, the repercussions of the dual-track decision 
stirred up the traditional aims, orientations and patterns of peace activism in these coun-
tries. In Switzerland, the »Swiss Peace Council« (Schweizerischer Friedensrat, SFR) had 
since 1945 functioned as an umbrella organization for a wide variety of non-communist, 
non-aligned peace initiatives. The traditional focus of his interventions had been the do-
mestic scene, with demands for a proper civilian service as an alternative to conscription, 
the abolition of the court-martial system and a curb on Swiss weapons exports. Over the 
years, various referenda on these issues had been held in the Swiss system of direct de-
mocracy, but they had always ended with an overwhelming defeat for the peace move-
ment.104 
In the wake of the dual-track solution, this began to change, as the »Swiss Peace Move-
ment« (Schweizerische Friedensbewegung, SFB), an affiliate of the Communist-led World 
Peace Council, but also a number of independent groups made headway and seized the 
initiative. These groups not only introduced new, performative forms of protest actions 
which were new to the Swiss domestic scene, such as »Fasting for Peace«, Menschen-
teppiche (Human Carpets) and a military tax boycott. They also started to connect Swiss 
security policies with the wider European situation and argued that despite its armed neu-
trality, Switzerland was severely endangered by a possible nuclear war. This was a fron-
tal assault on the national consensus built around the legitimacy of the army in the system 
of armed neutrality. The mobilization of these groups, which reached a peak in 1983 / 84, 
was hampered by the weak integration and political tensions between the various initia-
tives. But as a result of the anti-Euromissiles campaign, peace activists had for the first 
time fundamentally challenged the post-war consensus of the Swiss nation and its reliance 
on a military defence system, a critique which was neatly summed up in the name of the 
action committee »We don’t want to be defended to death« (WIWONITO), founded in 
1981.105 
A similar development can be observed in Austria. In October 1983, on the peak of the 
campaign against the dual-track solution, more than 100,000 demonstrators gathered on 
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the streets of Vienna, and the antinuclear campaign, organised by a steering committee, 
had gained widespread support by the SPÖ, the governing Socialist Party, but also by 
trade union activists, Communists and by the Greens.106 Already in 1985, however, this 
collective effervescence had come to an end. Activists of established peace groups such 
as the Austrian branch of the »International Fellowship of Reconciliation« (IFOR) had 
been sceptical from the start about this short-lived wave of antinuclear activism, and 
rather continued their traditional, value-driven educational work. The mobilization wave 
had had a more substantial and long-lasting impact among members of the Unabhängigen 
Friedensinitiativen (Independent Peace Initiatives, UFI), mostly undogmatic socialists 
and activists in the alternative milieu. They had not only envisaged to work on the ›big‹, 
political issues when they embarked on their peace-work, but had also had a strong in-
terest in the ›small‹, ›human‹ issues. Many of them were simply keen to meet people in 
other countries, and not only started to travel in Italy, Greece, Hungary and Slovenia, but 
also took the effort to learn the languages of these countries.107 This was, however, not 
only a European cosmopolitanism based on the experience of touristic »leisure time com-
munication« abroad.108 It also had direct political consequences, as exemplified by Werner 
Wintersteiner, who not only learned Italian and met many people while travelling abroad. 
He also initiated the »Villach proposal« in 1984, a sustained attempt to connect peace 
activists in Northern Italy, Austria and Slovenia and to turn this region into a nuclear-
weapons free zone.109 
III. THE TWO AMERICAS: AMBIVALENCES OF FRAMING 
Antinuclear protests in post-war Europe were facilitated by frames, shared perceptions of 
the reality of a society which had apparently, at least seen from the perspective of those 
who shared this frame, led to the unmanageable dangers of nuclear armaments, both with 
regard to the risk of war and with regard to the perceived devastating effects of military 
expenditure on social inequality and poverty. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the most 
important frame for antinuclear protests in Western Europe was an idealist rhetoric of 
humanism. There were many different versions and implications of this rhetoric. Some 
German pacifists such as Fritz von Unruh, a former cavalry officer in the Imperial Ger-
man Army, invoked Beethoven’s ›Ode to Joy‹ and its expectation that »All men will be 
brothers« to suggest a specifically European, Christian humanism as the basis for world 
peace.110 Against the historical backdrop of National Socialism, the protesters of the West 
German Easter March movement were driven by a guilt conscience, and thus framed 
their protest against the bomb as »a commitment to human rights«, which should hence-
forth define German national identity.111 Their counterparts in British CND, on the other 
hand, tapped into the rhetoric of non-conformist Protestantism to describe »the bomb as 
the symbol of the break-up of community into alienated human beings«, and thus aimed 
—————— 
106 Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 166. 
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to rebuild British morality as a contribution to global humanism.112 In a poem written in 
1962 by CND-activist Pat Arrowsmith, »This is your death«, the humanist frame was ex-
pressed as a revulsion against the system of role differentiation in society, which could 
bring people to believe that the role of a professional soldier was reconcilable with their 
civilian personality: 
»[…] This is your death 
When you state, ›I am not me 
But two or three people: 
A skilled professional slayer 
And a kind father.‹«113 
Humanist frames were not only crucial for Protestant nuclear pacifists in the 1950s and 
1960s, they also allowed Catholics to articulate their critique of the bomb. In Italy, the 
parish priest and former military chaplain Don Primo Mazzolari was one of the foremost 
proponents of a left Catholicism, from the early 1940s until his death in 1959. Since 
1949, Don Mazzolari edited the fortnightly journal Adesso, which turned into one of the 
most important voices of a critical Catholicism to the left of the ruling Democrazia Cris-
tiana. Mazzolari combined pacifism with a struggle against injustice and social inequality, 
and he rejected the attempts of the Church hierarchy to stifle and control independent lay 
initiative through the rigid framework of the Catholic Action.114 In 1955, he published his 
reflections on peace in a booklet entitled Tu non uccidere!, a critique of the theory of ›just 
war‹ and an indictment against the hypocrisy of a Christian ›civilization‹ that supported 
the bomb.115 
Another crucial proponent of Catholic antinuclear pacifism in Italy during the 1950s 
was Giorgio La Pira (1904–1977), who served as mayor of Florence since 1951. In this 
capacity, he organised a series of conferences on »Civilization and Peace« which brought 
together some of the most prominent Catholic thinkers and theologians from many coun-
tries in Europe and beyond. The final statement of the first conference in 1952 declared 
that »true peace« was impossible to achieve where the »spiritual vocation« of »human 
beings« was not guaranteed.116 These examples should suffice to make clear that the 
»metaphysics of antinuclearism« were a common frame among both Socialist, Protestant 
and Catholic peace activists during the first mobilization wave until 1963.117 
In a remarkable contrast to the metaphysical nature of framing in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the antinuclear protests during the 1980s were embedded in practical, tangible frames. 
The most tangible perceptions for many peace activists across Western Europe were the 
facts that the Cruise Missiles were American weapons and that US-politicians, particu-
larly Ronald Reagan, who took office as US-president in January 1981, and Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig, were the foremost promoters of the dual-track solution as a neces-
sary complement and reaction to the increasing number of Soviet SS-20 missiles. To be 
—————— 
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sure, European politicians had contributed to one strand of the debates in the run-up to 
the dual-track decision, most notably the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In his fa-
mous speech at the London International Institute for Strategic Studies on 28 October 
1977 he drew attention to the military disparity in Central Europe as a result of USSR-
armaments.118 But in the perception of and visual representations by peace activists, 
Schmidt and other domestic politicians had at best supporting roles as »further speakers« 
in the grand drama »A Man walks over Corpses«, presented by the »White House Cor-
poration« and starring the former Hollywood B-movie actor Reagan in the leading role, 
depicted in his trademark pose with a pistol in his hand and a cowboy hat.119 
Historians who are close to the peace movement usually tend to downplay the signifi-
cance of anti-American attitudes as a crucial factor in the framing of and thus the mobi-
lization for the campaign against the Euromissiles in the early 1980s.120 Opinion polls, 
however, despite methodological reservations one might have against the use of scales 
for the measurement of political attitudes, provide substantial and reliable evidence for 
the fact that anti-Americanism121 was a pivotal attitude among peace movements activists 
and, to a lesser degree, sympathisers. According to Eurobarometer polls conducted in 
April 1982 and again in April 1986, »members« of the movement were »twice as likely 
as opponents […] to believe that Americans are not trustworthy«, and »four times as 
likely« to show high scores on a scale that combined responses to a variety of questions 
to model political anti-Americanism.122 Peace activists in Western Europe were, how-
ever, »as critical of Soviet foreign policy« as with regard to US foreign policy. As such, 
they basically refused to buy into the assumption held by most West Europeans that the 
bi-polar world of the Cold War contained »one good superpower and one bad super-
power«.123 
Quantitative information about anti-American attitudes as a frame for antinuclear ac-
tivism needs to be supplemented by a qualitative analysis of the symbols and metaphori-
cal expressions which informed and fuelled these attitudes. I will present some material 
for such an analysis with regard to the Federal Republic and Italy, and will stress the 
overarching point that the anti-American framing was never undisputed and straightfor-
ward. Images and metaphors of American power-craziness and unrelenting drive for mili-
—————— 
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tary aggression prevailed.124 But many activists also acknowledged positive traditions of 
the ›other‹ America, both in spatial and in political and cultural terms. A song by Herbert 
Grönemeyer shall serve to illustrate this point. It will also exhibit some of the essential 
anti-American perceptions among West German activists in the 1980s. One of the key 
1980s stars of a pop-cultural current aptly called Deutschrock, Grönemeyer was rather a 
fellow-traveller of the movement than its foremost troubadour, but he showed an ingenious 
ability to tap into the emotions of his youthful audience. His album »4630 Bochum«, re-
leased in 1984, included a song entitled »America«: 
»you are coming as saviour in every need 
you show your sheriff star to the world 
you send semi trailers into the night 
you bring yourself in position, america 
oh america 
you have done so much for us 
oh america 
don’t do that to us 
many care parcels you have send to us 
today missiles, america 
you have so much more space over there than we 
why should they be here, america 
oh america 
then fight, if you have to fight, 
in your own country 
you want to excel in everything 
larger, faster, further, america 
I feel angst about your phantasies 
about your ambition, america 
oh america 
invite russia to your place, finally 
be united, indignant and disarmed [entrüstet euch], america 
or shoot yourselves together up to the moon 
fight yourselves up there, the moon is uninhabited«125 
In his lyrics, Grönemeyer turned American »ambition« into a cause for German angst. He 
invoked the Care-parcels dispatched to freezing and malnourished Germans in the rubble 
society of the immediate post-war years as a positive symbol for American altruism, while 
rejecting the unwanted missiles and implying that the Germans would not any longer 
need to be thankful or deferent for American liberation from Nazi dictatorship in 1945. 
Tapping into the chain of signifiers ›Ronald Reagan-film actor-western films-sheriff‹, 
the song denounced the selfish and aggressive nature of the US-claim to police the world. 
When invoking the lack of space in Germany as an argument, however, Grönemeyer 
tapped into a commonplace that was shared by those who tried to stem the tide of anti-
American sentiment. When chancellor Schmidt tried to explain this current even among 
his own party comrades to interlocutors from the US, he would always point out that the 
FRG comprised only 2.5 % of US territory, but would already store 50 % of the US nu-
clear potential.126 
—————— 
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The ambivalent images of the two Americas, seen as a force of liberation and as an im-
perialist power, were often displayed. A poster inviting to an »anti-NATO demo« in June 
1982 in the city of Gießen depicted the statue of liberty, a classical symbol of America 
as a haven for the oppressed and downtrodden, here adorned with sunglasses and thus 
giving her a pop-cultural touch. Out of her head, however, grow serpents with the heads 
of Reagan, Schmidt, Thatcher, Haig and a GI, thus showing her as Medusa, one of the 
three Gorgons, a figure that had often been used in anti-Semitic discourse.127 Even where 
outright moral righteousness and a Manichaean discourse prevailed, as among many 
Protestant ministers and theologians, who often combined these strands with apocalyptic 
doomsday scenarios, some balancing remarks were added. In a conversation with the 
Spiegel-magazine in the autumn of 1983, Dorothee Sölle minced no words. As a Protes-
tant theologian, a supporter of the progressive Latin American liberation theology and as 
an active participant in protests such as the blockade of the US weapons-depot in Mut-
langen in September 1983, Sölle had just reached the apex of her public fame and popu-
larity among progressive Christians in Germany. In the interview, she repeated her often 
used comparison of 1983 with 1933, condemning both Hitler and the bomb as »antichrist«, 
and insisted that the »global holocaust« was nigh. In a gloomy remark, she added: »The 
evil has an address, has a telephone number. […] We can name it. We know who de-
stroyed Hiroshima, not to speak of Nagasaki. We can trace the US senators who are in 
favour of further armaments and will gain profit from it with their dividends.«128 Quizzed 
about these stark enemy images, which stood in a pronounced contrast to the gospel of 
love and reconciliation, she hastened to add that she »would love the American people« 
and would know that only 27 % of Americans had voted for Reagan.129 
Sölle’s interview with the Spiegel-magazine revealed also another aspect of the anti-
Americanism of the West German peace movement, its connection with and support for 
a new German nationalism. Sölle described Germany’s lack of independent decision 
making vis-à-vis the US as a superpower as a new form of »colonialism«. Confronted 
with the questionable moral rationale for such a critique against the backdrop of German 
liberation from Fascism by American troops, she added that this »nationalist element« of 
the peace movement would be a »quite productive affair«, as the approval of Germans 
would be needed if their territory should be more than »just the theatre of war«.130 The 
German campaign against the Euromissiles »linked pacifism with nationalism, because the 
security fears central to its identity formed the basis for a new facet of German identity.«131 
—————— 
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Expressions of this new nationalism were widespread among many of the constituent 
groups of the peace movement. Protestant theologians were particularly outspoken. An 
older generation of theologians could tap into notions of a national Protestantism they 
had already held during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when they tried to present disar-
mament as a lever to achieve reunification. The theologian Helmut Gollwitzer, for in-
stance, had been a high-profile member of the »Campaign for Disarmament«, which was 
since 1962 the official name of the movement that organized and supported the West 
German Easter Marches.132 Echoing the resentment of Dorothee Sölle, he wrote in 1981 
in a letter to the editor of the Spiegel-magazine: 
»No public outcry sweeps away a government which gives the sovereignty of the state away with 
regard to a crucial issue. This demonstrates the extent to which the Germans have been left spine-
less as a result of Hitlerei, defeat, Marshall plan bribery and Russenangst. […] Something like this 
has never happened before in European history, only in the history of colonialism. […] No German 
can accept this unconditional subjugation of the interests of our people under foreign interests, this 
surrender of control about the existence of our people to a foreign government.«133 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this diatribe against American power preponderance 
was not the way in which Gollwitzer compared the fate of the Germans with that of co-
lonial subjects, but rather the use of the collective personal pronoun »our people« (unse-
res Volkes), repeated twice in a single sentence. This was an idiomatic phrase which had 
been only very rarely used in the semantics of the West German left since 1945. Speaking 
with emphasis on behalf of the German people as a collective had been part and parcel of 
the semantics of völkisch nationalism and was hence a no-go-area for anyone who had 
drawn some lessons of the Nazi past. Social Democrats after 1945 expressed their na-
tionalist sentiments with the semantics of the nation-state rather than the people. The fact 
that such a language resurfaced in the anti-Euromissiles campaign shows how desperate 
many Social Democrats and other non-communist leftists were to wrestle hegemony over 
the discourse on the ›national question‹ from the Christian Democrats. Peter Brandt, born 
in 1948, and Herbert Ammon, born 1943, both of whom had gone through the usual com-
mitment to far-left groups after the student revolt of 1968, were among those who tried 
to instil the peace movement with nationalist ideas. Participating in a »Berlin-Working 
Group«, they saw »German unity« and the severing of ties with the military blocs as a 
»presupposition« for peace in Europe.134 For Peter Brandt, the son of Willy Brandt, a pro-
fessional historian who was working as an assistant professor in Berlin at the time, his 
commitment to a left nationalism was part of his attempts to disentangle the idea of na-
tion from the right and to demonstrate the progressive potential of nationalism. Ammon, 
however, co-editor of their source collection on the »Left and the national question«, was 
simultaneously active in rightwing-circles.135 Seen in the historical context, this fact that 
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helps to explain why neo-fascists could not only mimic but truly adopt both the symbols 
and the anti-Americanism of the 1980s peace movement after German reunification in 
1990.136 
The anti-Americanism and nationalism of the 1980s West German peace movement did 
not escape the attention of contemporary observers, both in Germany and abroad.137 Al-
ready in 1982, Volkmar Deile from Aktion Sühnezeichen had to respond to many anxious 
queries from peace activists in Belgium and the Netherlands who were concerned about 
the attempts to link disarmament with German reunification. Deile himself feared the 
possible negative repercussions of the German focus on the »national question« for joint 
European movement activism.138 The political class in France was quick to identify, in 
comparison with the shared European characteristics of antinuclear pacifism, a »frustrated 
nationalism« as the distinguishing feature of the West German campaign.139 In the Federal 
Republic, at least some leftist critics were putting the new nationalism at their end of the 
political spectrum under close scrutiny. Wolfgang Pohrt, a journalist who was well-versed 
in the ›negative dialectics‹ of the Frankfurt School, described the neutron bomb as the 
»fuse for a German-national awakening movement«.140 While this was a polemical re-
mark, it also contained a kernel of truth, not only because pietist ideas about the sinful 
nature of the atomic bomb were deeply ingrained in the peace movement. In a historical 
perspective, pietism had also been a crucial trailblazer and core constituency for German 
nationalism.141 Ultimately, both anti-Americanism and nationalism of the West German 
campaign were bound up with the perception held by many Germans that they were vic-
timised by the decision to deploy Cruise Missiles and by their potential use, a feeling 
which was summed up in the catchphrase of an imminent ›Euroshima‹. A local voter’s 
initiative for the Greens in Ammerland (Lower Saxony) presented their support for the 
»Krefeld Appeal« under the heading »We want no Euroshima!«, citing a statement by 
US Secretary of State Alexander Haig that there were »more important things than to 
sustain peace« for the Americans.142 
—————— 
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While many West German peace activists paid only lip-service to a positive image of 
the American people, the perceptions framing antinuclear activism in Italy were much 
more complex. Protests against the deployment of Cruise Missiles in Comiso (Sicily) 
sparked a very heterogeneous campaign, which mainly consisted of members of the eco-
logical movement and the Green party, and members of the small Radical Party under 
the leadership of Marco Panella, which had agitated on a platform of radical pacifism 
and unilateral disarmament since its beginnings in the 1960s. Although the leadership of 
the main opposition party, the Eurocommunist PCI, rejected the dual-track-solution in 
principle, it was not able – and due to the danger of reigniting anti-Communist stereo-
types – also not willing to mobilize its rank-and-file members in a broad coalition against 
the deployment.143 Both the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and the leadership of the 
main governing party, Democrazia Cristiana, were firm in their support of the NATO-
decision. As a result of the campaign, however, the DC-leadership felt the need to re-
connect with lay Catholics and to thread a fine line distinguishing between ›good‹ Chris-
tian pacifism and a ›bad‹ fundamentalism. In late 1979, some of the largest associations 
of lay Catholics, including not only the pacifists in Pax Christi and Mani Tese, but also 
Focolari (a spiritual movement founded in 1943), ACLI (the Christian Worker’s Asso-
ciation), and other groups of the Catholic labour movement, had joined ranks for a unique 
manifestation of lay initiative. They addressed the parliament, and particularly those 
members who based »on the Gospel the reasons and the motives in order to set up a proper 
life«, in two open letters. They demanded to abandon the idea that peace could be based 
on armaments and on an equilibrium of terror, to stop the »spiral of destructive power« 
and to commence a »unilateral reduction of military spending.«144 
This was an impressive manifestation of the inroads pacifist ideas had made into many 
groups and lay initiatives on the left wing of Italian Catholicism. Left Catholics shared 
the rejection of US-imperialism, which was the only widely shared frame of the hetero-
geneous campaign against the Euromissiles in Italy.145 Their anti-Americanism, how-
ever, was matched by a positive orientation towards Latin America. The interest of Italian 
Catholic pacifists in Latin America was based on symbolic representations of progressive 
Catholicism in countries such as Brazil, Nicaragua, Chile and Mexico, and elsewhere. 
During the rallies against Cruise Missiles in Comiso in 1981 / 82, for instance, demon-
strators displayed posters showing Oscar Romero, the bishop from El Salvador who had 
spoken out against the poverty and the brutal repression in his country, and who was shot 
on 24 March 1980 by a right-wing death squad while celebrating mass.146 
The significance of Latin America for Italian Catholic pacifism was also based on per-
sonal links as a result of mass emigration of Italians to countries such as Argentine and 
Brazil. Since the late 1960s, when Latin American bishops and theologians rallied be-
hind the programme of liberation theology, with its denunciation of underdevelopment 
and military dictatorship and its ›option for the poor‹, a radical reinterpretation of the 
gospel in favour of those affected by exclusion, an increasingly dense network of personal 
—————— 
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communications and exchanges between liberation theologians and Italian peace activists 
emerged.147 For Italian left Catholics in the 1970s and early 1980s, empathy with progres-
sive Catholics in Latin America addressed three different aspects of framing: as a »diag-
nostic« frame, it identified global capitalism and its corollary, global injustice, as the 
root cause of the arms spiral and its disastrous effects on people in underdeveloped coun-
tries; as a »prognostic« frame, it envisaged joint action of the people in Western and in 
›Third World‹-countries as a possible solution; and the spiritual vitality of the leading 
liberation theologians and the grassroots communities inspired by them worked as a »mo-
tivational« frame, which triggered and channelled the protest communication.148 This dis-
tinctive framing of Catholic peace activism during the 1970s confirmed and extended 
elements of Italian pacifism which had already been apparent in debates on non-violence 
during the 1950s, for instance in the work of the proponent of Gandhian ideas, Aldo 
Capitini (1899–1968).149 With their focus on the link between injustice and violence on a 
global scale and the search for a ›third camp‹ between capitalism and state socialism, 
Italian activists considered the dangers of nuclear weapons in a wider perspective, both 
in thematic and in spatial terms, than many of their European counterparts. 
IV. POLITICS OF CONCERN: WOMEN’S PROTESTS AND THE GENDERING 
OF PEACE 
Gender is in many respects an important category to understand the dynamics of antinu-
clear protests during the Cold War. Not only were the anti-American frames of peace 
activism based on gendered perceptions, as indeed many other enemy-images held on 
both sides of the bloc confrontation more generally.150 Gender is also crucial for an analy-
sis of the aims and practises of women’s peace movements, as these movements formed 
an important strand of European antinuclearism from the mid-1940s until the caesura of 
1990. With regard to the aims of protest, gender can help to understand how female peace 
activists conceptualised their specific calling for and contribution to a world without nu-
clear arms. With regard to practices, historians should seek to analyse, firstly, if and how 
widespread peace activism helped to promote alternative gender roles in society, and, 
secondly, how these roles were put into practice in the workings of the peace groups 
themselves.151 The following remarks are only a first and tentative attempt to address 
some of these issues, with a strong focus, due to the uneven state of research in this field, 
on British women’s peace protests in the 1980s. They are incomplete also in conceptual 
terms, as they do not address, although implied by gender as a relational category, to 
what extent the protests brought new forms of masculinity to the fore. Did antinuclear 
activists develop a muscular pacifism, which allowed to demonstrate the strength of their 
commitment and to fend off accusations of effeminacy? Or did they try to develop dif-
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ferent, non-hegemonic forms of masculinity?152 These are important questions which 
should be tackled by comparative research. 
In the immediate post-war period, female pacifists in many European countries had to 
grapple with the political consequences and moral legacies of the Second World War. 
These issues had a particular urgency for female peace activism in the Federal Republic 
and in Italy. Here, in these post-Fascist countries, activists had to meet the challenge of 
coming to terms with a peculiar national past. In Germany, activist Freda Wuesthoff 
gathered many prominent representatives of the bourgeois women’s movement from the 
interwar period in a »Stuttgart Peace Circle«. During their meetings, they discussed the 
specific contribution women could make to a peaceful reconstruction of Germany. As a 
trained physicist, Wuesthoff focused on the perils of nuclear weapons and considered 6 
August 1945, when the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, to be her »key experience« for 
a commitment to female citizenship. This focus on the bomb, if deliberately or inadver-
tently, also helped to avoid any serious engagement with German guilt and female par-
ticipation in the Nazi-regime.153 In Italy, women’s peace activism was not only one im-
portant form to explore and strengthen the new dimensions of female citizenship which 
had opened up with the introduction of women’s suffrage for national elections in 1946. 
It was also, as in particular the Communist peace activists of the »Italian Women’s Union« 
(Unione donne italiane, UDI) pointed out repeatedly, an opportunity to stress the need to 
distinguish between the Fascist dictatorship and the Italian people, many of whom, they 
claimed, had participated in the »anti-Fascist struggle« of the resistenza. Thus, a female 
commitment to peace provided also an opportunity to underpin the Italian desire to »re-
turn to its position in the community of democratic nations«.154 Women in the Centro 
italiano femminile (CIF), however, a group that had been founded in late 1944 and that 
was closely associated with the Catholic Church, pursued a different agenda. Catholics 
in Italy and abroad were their preferred interlocutors, and in their engagement for peace 
they envisaged a European federation based on the principles of an idealised Christian 
Europe.155 
Communist and Catholic women’s activists in Italy had established separate organiza-
tions almost immediately upon the liberation of their country. Activists in the UDI con-
tinued throughout the late 1940s and in the following decade to accuse bourgeois and 
Catholic women pacifists of being »apolitical«. The UDI supported the activities of the 
Partigiani della pace, the Italian member in the Communist-led World Peace Council. In 
1949, the Partigiani della pace had collected signatures against an Italian NATO-mem-
bership. This initiative had yielded a massive response. Women were well represented 
among the six million Italians who signed this appeal.156 These opposite and openly con-
trarian endeavours, however, illuminated a problem. In what respect could women claim 
to make a specific contribution to the struggle for peace, if they were organized along 
political cleavages and directed most of their energies to propaganda which contributed 
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further to a hardening of Cold War fissures? In Italy, the Associazione internationazionale 
madri unite per la pace (AIMU), founded in 1946 by Maria Remiddi, aimed to overcome 
the Cold War fault line. Supported by liberal democratic women, AIMU, which became 
the Italian section of the »Women's International League for Peace and Freedom« (WILPF) 
in 1957, tried to reach out to the opposing camps and to establish a transversal women’s 
solidarity for peace based on the semantics of motherliness.157 These attempts, however, 
yielded only ambivalent results, as Remiddi explained in a letter to Aldo Capitini in May 
1954. AIMU activists in Rome had had many encounters with Communist women, and 
they had not only been welcomed with »great cordiality«, but also discovered a strong 
»will to work together« and a »complete and profound« agreement in their respective 
views on issues of peace and armaments. But in the aftermath of such meetings, Noi 
donne, the journal of the Communist UDI, had repeatedly misrepresented these encoun-
ters as if the women from AIMU had joined ranks with the Communists. Experiences 
like these were, as Remiddi concluded, particularly off-putting for those women in her 
association who had a »clear political personality«, but did certainly not want to be com-
promised by such a coverage.158 In comparable attempts to overcome the Cold War fault 
line and to stress their genuine contribution to peace, German women’s peace activists 
until the mid-1950s vacillated between attempts to overcome motherliness as a pro-
gramme and a focus on an »essentialist motherliness«.159 
It is still a largely unresolved issue to what extent antinuclear protests during the 1950s 
and 1960s were able to challenge traditional gender roles, to empower women and to 
usher into »more egalitarian ideas« about the relation between men and women. Further 
research into these questions is urgently required.160 There can be no doubt, however, 
that women’s antinuclear protests during the 1980s provided a fundamental challenge not 
only to societal gender roles, but also to organizational routines and gender roles in peace 
activism and to the public debate about nuclear armaments more generally. I will discuss 
some of the key characteristics of these developments by taking Greenham Common as 
an example, not only because this protest has produced a wealth of primary material, but 
has also received some scholarly attention.161 
In September 1981, a handful of women from Wales, most of whom were associated 
with the group »Women for Life on Earth«, set off to march from Cardiff to Greenham 
Common in Berkshire, site of a Royal Air Force base which had de facto been put under 
the control of the US Air Force and was earmarked for the deployment of Cruise Missiles. 
They had been motivated by reports about a walk from Copenhagen to Paris, organized 
by Scandinavian women peace activists. Locally, their mobilization was based on a broad 
cross-section of people situated in an alternative milieu, anarchists, Christian feminists, 
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Quakers and others. Upon their arrival at the site, they decided to set up a peace camp 
outside the perimeter fence.162 Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp, as it became 
known to a wider public within only a couple of months, attracted widespread interest 
from a very diverse spectrum of ›ordinary‹ women and self-declared feminists from many 
different backgrounds, both from the UK and from abroad. In terms of the their social 
background, the long-term supporters of the camp were equally diverse, a fact that serves 
to refute the assumptions of the ›new social movement‹-approach about a correlation be-
tween the new middle-class of academically trained specialists and a ›post-materialist‹ 
propensity for protest.163 Those women who were in paid employment worked in a variety 
of jobs, and many of the ›campers‹ had no paid employment and were depending on state 
benefits, husbands or their parents.164 After intensive discussions, the women decided in 
February 1982 to turn the camp into a women-only protest and asked the few remaining 
men to leave. This was a momentous decision, as it opened up a flank for the overwhelm-
ingly hostile coverage of the camp in the British media, which portrayed the protesters as 
a bunch of lesbians with unshaved legs. To these stereotypes the women responded, self-
ironically, by calling themselves »brazen hussies«: 
»We’re brazen hussies 
And we don’t give a damn […] 
Men call us names to be nasty and rude, 
Like lesbian, man hater, witch and prostitute 
What a laugh, ‘cause half of it’s true.«165 
Part of the success and the radicalism of Greenham Common was the refusal to substan-
tiate female commitment to nuclear disarmament in one particular form of femininity, as 
earlier generations of activists had done it with their reliance on organized motherliness. 
While the initial press release which had announced the march to Greenham expressed 
opposition to nuclear weapons »in terms of women’s roles as carers and nurturers«, it 
also framed the protest in the context of a »feminist discourse about women’s exclusion 
from political life«, and with a »materialist« argument.166 This materialism was an impor-
tant part of both of the motivations for protest and the political intervention of Greenham 
Common. Trident missiles fired from submarines were criticised with the lines »We can’t 
afford medication or proper education, but we must pay, a million a day, so that Britain 
can disappear.«167 Anne Pettitt, one of the organizers of the march from Cardiff, ex-
plained her motivation to protest with her disgust about political leaders who »squander 
vast sums of money and human resources on weapons of mass destruction while we can 
hear in our hearts the millions of human beings throughout the world whose needs cry 
out to be met.«168 An interest in material wellbeing, including a proper provision with 
key public services such as hospitals and schools, was part and parcel of the motivation 
of many women to camp outside the RAF base at Greenham. As women, they tried to 
reject traditional labels and gender roles, also with regard to the vicious cycle that had 
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women left in bereavement while their sons and husbands had been called up and killed 
in the First and Second World War. One of the many songs which were frequently per-
formed in the camp expressed this search for diversity in expressions of femininity in a 
fictitious dialogue with an older woman: 
»And now you’re growing older 
And in time the photos fade 
And in widowhood you sit back 
And reflect on the parade 
Of the passing of your memories 
As your daughters change their lives 
Seeing more to our existence 
Than just mothers, daughters, wives.«169 
As a women’s project, Greenham Common aimed to sustain an »elective« community of 
women, based on a non-essentialist feminism which was able to accommodate a wide 
variety of possible personal and sexual orientations.170 As a political project and a protest 
movement, Greenham Common was based on a fundamental critique of both the estab-
lished antinuclearism of CND and END, and of the political elites and their decision-
making. As in similar actions by women in other Western European countries, this dou-
ble broadside against masculine forms of political engagement rested on the diversity of 
female identities and on the attempt to explore the ›personal as political‹, the key principle 
second wave feminism had proclaimed since the late 1960s.171 Political action had to be 
based on the »autonomy« of personal choices and political decisions, an autonomy which 
was best exercised in the face-to-face encounters of women in a small »peer group« which 
resembled a »family«.172 Male peace activists in the UK, and members of CND in particu-
lar, rejected the approach taken by Greenham women as divisive for the peace move-
ment. A report issued by CND in 1983 stated that they would bury »a potentially popular 
cause in a tide of criticism levelled against them on personal grounds.«173 
But these ›personal‹ issues were precisely those which had motivated women to pur-
sue independent and autonomous forms of protest. They were tired of traditional forms of 
protest, which were largely confined to an endless stream of meetings characterised by 
the »posturing or speech-making« of male activists. All they wanted was »just speaking, 
listening, hearing«.174 While CND meetings were »very bureaucratic« and »invariably run 
by blokes«, women activists sought to establish a forum where they could express their 
»fear, panic« and »terrible distress« about the impending dangers of Cruise Missiles.175 
In Britain and in mainland Europe, such an approach also implied a fundamental critique 
of the organizational machismo of peace campaigning, which was still, or, due to the in-
tensive media interest even more than in the 1960s, characterized by »manager« and 
»Macker« (blokes) figures. On purpose, they would neglect women in the media relations 
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of the movement and would only invite reformist women to press conferences.176 Defying 
both traditional protest politics and the political establishment, radical feminist pacifism 
in the early 1980s was based on a fundamental critique of the »politics of inherent neces-
sities« (Politik der Sachzwänge) and its discursive underpinnings.177 In the 1980s, both 
the defence community and established antinuclear movements relied heavily on scien-
tific expertise in order to justify or deny the necessity for a new generation of nuclear 
weapons. Both defence intellectuals and peace researchers tried to prove the cogency and 
valency of their ›facts‹ with an elaborate apparatus of statistical calculations, graphs and 
other models derived from political science.178 But this discourse of objectivity failed to 
impress and convince the women at Greenham Common. They objected to the weapons 
quite deliberately as laypersons with regard to the intricate details of arms control and 
political necessities, subverting an approach were men mostly worked »with their heads« 
or at least tried to rationalize their emotions with scientific models. Instead, the women 
of Greenham Common sought a »chance to express themselves and their feelings«.179 
Theirs was not a (masculine) politics of instrumental rationality. They preferred non-
violent action that lead to a state of »trance«.180 
Ultimately, thus, the women’s protests against nuclear weapons during the 1980s were 
based on a politics of concern. Women engaged in protest actions because they were af-
fected by and, as civilians, women and mothers, personally concerned about the deci-
sions taken by male politicians and officers. And the personal and quite emotional char-
acter of this concern structured the performative forms and rituals of their protest.181 In 
this respect, women’s antinuclearism at Greenham Common differed also from other, 
predominantly class-based protest movements in the 1980s. In 1984 / 85, the year-long 
miner’s strike conducted by the National Union of Mineworkers became one of the de-
fining moments in post-war British social history. Female campaigners tried to provide 
»a common link to antinuclear campaigns« under the heading »Mines not missiles«.182 
But the logic of protest was fundamentally different. While the miners went through a 
series of bitter clashes with the police, their struggle was based on the integrative and 
accumulative logic of nineteenth-century popular protest. Eventually, everyone, perhaps 
even the policemen, would join in, and the overarching solidarity ultimately outweighed 
the confrontation. Billy Bragg, the protest singer and foremost muse of the miner’s 
strike, expressed these ideas in his song »Which side are you on?«, written in 1985: 
»Which side are you on, boys? 
Which side are you on? 
Which side are you on, boys? 
Which side are you on? 
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We set out to join the picket line 
For together we cannot fail 
We got stopped by police at the county line 
They said, ›Go home boys or you're going to jail‹.«183 
The women at Greenham Common sang a song with the very same title. But their take 
on the same question drove home the core message that some people could simply not 
join in, that they stood and stayed on the other side of the rift between insanity and hu-
manity, between life and death. While there was space for a personal, moral decision to 
opt for life, the gap between decision-making and concern could never be overcome. 
»Which side are you on 
which side are you on 
are you on the other side from me 
which side are you on? 
Are you on the side that don't like life 
are you on the side of racial strife 
are you on the side that beats your wife 
which side are you on? 
I ask you – 
(chorus) 
Are you on the side who locks the door 
are you on the side who loves the Law 
are you on the side which wants a war 
which side are you on?«184 
The women who gathered at Greenham Common have had a notoriously bad press. While 
the campaign against Cruise Missiles lasted, most British newspapers despised them, and 
their reception in British public opinion was rather chilly.185 Even more than two decades 
after the events, some historians tend to ridicule them as »women on the verge«, restless 
in their efforts but without even the slightest impact on the greater scheme of things, i. e. 
the dual-track solution and the deployment of nuclear weapons.186 Such a negative assess-
ment is certainly correct as it is tremendously difficult to prove any direct impact of peace 
protests on political decision making.187 But searching for a direct impact of Greenham 
on political decisions is bound to miss the crucial point, as the confrontational style of the 
camp was not really meant to change the minds of politicians. Greenham Common mat-
tered as it opened the lid of »Pandora’s box«. Up to this point, nuclear strategy had been 
a »leadership decision«, discussed and finally »taken by an informed few.« The protests 
opened the box up for »public participation« in the debate on nuclear armaments.188 While 
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this assertion has been made with regard to the campaign against Euromissiles more 
generally, it is particularly true for the women’s protests at Greenham Common and else-
where. When housewives, mothers and other ›ordinary‹ women pitted their personal 
concern against the strategic ›necessities‹ proclaimed by the political elites, they dragged 
the nuclear debate from the detached sphere of policy-making and turned it into a matter 
for everyday-life. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Shortly after the collapse of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the 
veteran peace researcher Dieter Senghaas published a book on the »Peace Project Europe«. 
This was, argued from the perspective of a political scientist, one of the many attempts 
to envision a scenario in which Europeans could cash in on the peace dividend after the 
end of the Cold War, and could start to build a unified political space based on a com-
mitment to non-violent conflict resolution and to a reduction of both nuclear and conven-
tional armaments.189 As this brief essay on the history of antinuclear peace activism during 
the Cold War has shown, though, Europe was not really a peace project, at least not in 
terms of a deliberate attempt to conceptualise antinuclear activism across Europe. Many 
Europeans were involved in sustained attempts to halt or curb nuclear armaments in the 
decades until 1990, and their endeavours could build on the established European tradi-
tions of pacifism.190 Also, they were able to adapt these traditions for the nuclear age. But 
already the Western European countries were too diverse and too fragmented, in terms of 
their geo-strategic position, their inclusion in military alliances, their party-system and 
also in terms of distinctive cultural traditions which informed protests in search of alter-
native security policies and radical non-violence.191 In a stark contrast to the develop-
ments in Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or trade union activism, a European polity, 
a space for a shared approach to defence politics did not emerge, neither on the side of 
the peace protesters, nor, for that matter, on the side of the decision-makers. Even the 
protest movements during the Euromissiles campaign in the 1980s kept their distinctive 
—————— 
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national characteristics and orientations at least to some extent. For all these reasons, it 
does not seem helpful to interpret the trajectory of peace movements in post-war Europe 
in terms of a narrative of convergence or even integration.192 Even while movement ac-
tivists interacted and tried to coordinate their efforts across national borders, they did not 
simply merge into a European civil society. They were »subjects of Europe«, but did not 
constitute a European subject.193 In their worthwhile attempts to escape the confines of 
national narratives, historians should not make the mistake to reify the ›European‹ char-
acter of social phenomena. Europe was and is, in the end, a construct that can only be 
described from a multinational perspective.194 Or, in other words, instead of portraying 
Europe as the arché and telos, the origin and inherent goal of a universalist narrative, 
historians should narrate the history of Europe as a set of »differential processes«.195 
Throughout this article, I have stressed plurality, divergence and the fact that peace 
movements in many countries were bound up with the specific trajectory of their na-
tional context and its history. This insistence on the limits of antinuclear pacifism as a 
deliberate European project, however, should not motivate us to accept the assertion that 
the endeavours of antinuclear pacifists were futile and without significance for post-war 
European history. Such a negative assessment is usually based in a conventional ap-
proach to conceptualizing political history, which is focused on the autonomy of acts of 
»decision-making in the narrow sense.«196 Such an approach does not only ignore the 
possibility that peace movement activism, while perhaps not able to impact directly on 
key decisions such as the dual-track solution, may have had a more indirect but nonethe-
less crucial impact on the political process. One important example is the evolution of 
normative frameworks for acceptable security policies in the medium-term, not least the 
»nuclear taboo«, the refusal of US-decision makers to contemplate the actual use of nu-
clear weapons in earnest.197 In addition, the conventional focus on the policy and poli-
tics-dimension of the political fails to understand the major contribution of antinuclear 
activism to new performative forms of political communication. In order to analyze and 
conceptualize this aspect properly, a broader cultural history of the political is needed, 
with a focus on symbolic performances as a crucial prerequisite of the political proc-
ess.198 
—————— 
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Seen in this perspective, campaigners for nuclear disarmament made a vital contribu-
tion to post-war European history. While they failed to achieve a substantial number of 
their immediate aims, they were utterly successful in the creation of a new approach to 
politics, an approach that transcended the boundaries of the Cold War consensus through 
incremental change and paved the way for subsequent waves of protest movements, in-
cluding the feminist and ecological campaigns from the 1970s onwards. Some astute 
contemporary participants in and opponents of peace activism were aware of the changes 
this form of popular mobilization had brought about.199 During a discussion conference 
in June 1963, not by chance in a moment when CND had reached a deadlock with its 
campaigning and conflicts over strategy broke up, the political scientist Nigel Young at-
tempted to define the successes and failures of CND as a protest movement as follows: 
»We have failed in five years to spell out unilateralism; we have failed in education and organiza-
tion and central leadership; we have failed to experiment; and we have failed to show political 
courage. What we have succeeded in doing is in creating a ›style‹ – a new kind of politics in which 
policy is not of paramount importance. But even this style regularly wilts, and is in as much danger 
as the organization itself. […] With respect, this style has nothing to do with Canon Collin’s pipe 
or Peggy Duff’s red coat; it is the way the movement does things – the symbols and the pennants, 
the songs, the typography and lay-out of its posters and literature, the atmosphere of the marches 
and sit-downs, the attitude of direct-action and to individual participation. Moreover, it is the way in 
which the bomb is related to other issues, local and international. It is an ambience which is conta-
gious; it has spread to North America, to Scandinavia and the rest of Europe, it is still spreading; a 
new sort of politics.«200 
This was a clear recognition of both the limits and the successes of the peculiar CND-
style of campaigning. While it had opened up a new political space and ushered in a new 
language for the articulation of popular demands, it had infuriated the flag-bearers of a 
traditional top-down approach to the democratic political process, not only in the UK, 
but also in all other European countries where activists had followed the example of the 
Aldermaston march. In 1963, Anton Böhm, editor of the conservative newspaper Rheini-
scher Merkur, used a letter to Arno Klönne, a leading Catholic protagonist of the West 
German Easter March movement, to voice his criticism to the new political approach. He 
ridiculed protests with »pushchairs and toy balloons« as »foolish«. But while he desig-
nated his own critique as the position held by »politically considered people«, he failed 
to understand that the boundaries and parameters of the politically considerate were about 
to change.201 European antinuclear activists during the Cold War accomplished more than 
only offering »a quantum of solace« for societies living in the shadow of the bomb.202 
—————— 
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